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REDUCING AUTOMATIC STEREOTYPE ACTIVATION: MECHANISMS AND
MODERATORS OF SITUATIONAL ATTRIBUTION TRAINING

by

IOANA MARIA LATU

Under the Direction of Tracie L. Stewart

ABSTRACT

Individuals tend to underestimate situational causes and overly rely on trait causes in
explaining negative behaviors of outgroup members, a tendency named the ultimate attribution
error (Pettigrew, 1979). This attributional pattern is directly related to stereotyping, because
attributing negative behaviors to internal, stable causes tends to perpetuate negative stereotypes
of outgroup members. Recent research on implicit bias reduction revealed that circumventing
individuals’ tendency to engage in the ultimate attribution error led to reduced stereotyping.
More specifically, training White participants to consider situational factors in determining
Blacks’ negative stereotypic behaviors led to decreased automatic stereotype activation. This
technique was named Situational Attribution Training (Stewart, Latu, Kawakami, & Myers,

2010). In the current studies, I investigated the mechanisms and moderators of Situational
Attribution Training. In Study 1, I investigated the effect of training on spontaneous situational
inferences. Findings revealed that training did not increase spontaneous situational inferences:
both training and control participants showed evidence of spontaneous situational inferences. In
Study 2, I investigated whether correcting trait inferences by taking into account situational
factors has become automatic after training. In addition, explicit prejudice, motivations to
control prejudice, and cognitive complexity variables (need for cognition, personal need for
structure) were investigated as moderators of training success. These findings revealed that
Situational Attribution Training works best for individuals high in need for cognition, under
conditions of no cognitive load, but not high cognitive load. Training increased implicit bias for
individuals high in modern racism, regardless of their cognitive load. Possible explanations of
these findings were discussed, including methodological limitations and theoretical
implications.
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CHAPTER 1: REVIEW
In the current research I investigated the effectiveness of a training technique designed
to reduce implicit racial bias. The Situational Attribution Training (Stewart, Latu, Kawakami, &
Myers, 2010) technique is an implicit bias reduction method rooted in the theory behind the
ultimate attribution error (Pettigrew, 1979) – the tendency to attribute negative stereotypic
behaviors of outgroup members to dispositional causes, while underestimating the impact of
situational causes. In two studies, Stewart and colleagues found that teaching White participants
to consider situational causes of Black men’s negative behaviors led to reduced implicit bias. In
the current research, I focused on three main research questions related to the effectiveness of
Situational Attribution Training: whether training has an effect on situational inferences,
whether the effects of training are automatic, and whether individual differences moderate the
effects of training on implicit bias reduction.
It is important to consider the mechanisms and moderators of Situational Attribution
Training in the context of the larger literature on implicit bias, automaticity in social cognition,
and individual differences. Thus, the current chapter discusses the theoretical grounds on which
research on Situational Attribution Training was built. In the first part I discuss issues
surrounding the concept of implicit bias, such as the roots of implicit bias research, theoretical
models and methodological paradigms used to measure implicit bias, the relationship between
implicit bias and discriminatory behavior, as well as the effectiveness of implicit bias reduction
techniques. In the second part of this chapter I discuss the issue of automaticity in social
cognition, including research on assessing automaticity through cognitive load tasks as well as
research on spontaneous inferences. In the third part of the chapter I define and present research
on individual differences that may moderate the effects of Situational Attribution Training on
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implicit bias reduction. This part includes a discussion of explicit prejudice, motivations to
control prejudice, and cognitive complexity variables such as need for cognition (NFC) and
personal need for structure (PNS). Finally, the present chapter ends with an overview of the
research questions, methods, and specific hypotheses of the current research.

Implicit Bias
For more than two decades, social psychologists focusing on stereotyping and prejudice
have been interested in the study of implicit bias – associating certain social groups (e.g.,
women, African Americans) with certain traits (e.g., incompetent, lazy) or words that are
negative in valence (e.g., filth, vomit). Despite some controversies (Fazio & Olson, 2003;
Gawronski, LeBel, & Peters, 2007), these implicit attitudes and stereotypes are generally seen
as automatic: they occur without the person’s awareness, intention, and control, and they are
highly efficient, in the sense that they require few attentional resources to be activated (Bargh,
1994).

The Roots of Implicit Bias Research
As suggested by Amodio and Menodza (in press), research on implicit attitudes in social
psychology has two main roots: practical concerns about self-report (explicit) attitudes not
being able to predict behavior, as well as theoretical and methodological advances in other
fields, particularly in cognitive psychology.
First, early in the stereotype and prejudice research, there seemed to be a disconnect
between attitudes and behavior. For example, the famous Princeton Trilogy, a series of three
studies conducted to assess the content of African American stereotypes for college students,
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suggested that negative racial stereotypes were on the decline. In 1933, 75% of Katz and
Braly’s sample explicitly stated that African Americans are lazy, followed by 31% in 1951 in
Gilbert’s sample, and 26% in 1969 in Karlins, Coffman, and Walter’s sample. In 2001 (Madon
et al.) these percentages decreased even more: 12.1 and 0% in two samples of European
American students. The same linear decrease was visible for other negative stereotypic traits
such as superstitious, ignorant, ostentatious, and stupid. Despite these encouraging findings,
instances of discriminatory behavior were still documented in research. For example, Kempf
and Austin (1986) found consistent evidence of racial discrimination in sentencing, based on an
analysis of 2,907 tried cases in Pennsylvania in 1977. Juni, Brannon, and Roth (1988) reported a
same-race bias in consumer interactions, with White customers preferring White to Black
cashiers. In a more direct test of the relationship between racial attitudes and behavior, Rankin
and Campbell (1955) revealed that White college students had more negative physiological
reactions to a Black compared to a White experimenter, as measured by galvanic skinresponses, despite reporting similarly positive attitudes for Blacks and Whites. Given this
discrepancy between attitudes and behaviors, researchers began having a general skepticism
about self-report measures and proposed two possible explanations. First, it may be that
participants do not want to show their true attitudes about different social groups, due to social
desirability concerns (Paulhus, 1984). Alternatively, they may not be aware of their true
attitudes, because their introspective skills are limited and often guided by inaccurate naïve
theories of their own behavior. The use of implicit measures sought to address both of these
issues.
A second source of inspiration for the study of implicit attitudes and stereotypes came
from advances in the field of cognitive psychology, particularly learning and memory.
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Theoretically, cognitive psychologists advanced the idea that category processing may be
automatic, such that semantically related items are judged faster than non-related items.
Methodologically, new techniques were developed, such as the sequential priming technique,
which allowed for the measurement of semantic associations through reaction time tasks, as
opposed to self-report or explicit measures (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971, 1976). For example,
in one early study, participants made faster same-different judgments of letter strings when the
letter strings formed words that were semantically related compared to when they formed nonwords or words that were not semantically related (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971). This finding
is in line with predictions from spreading activation models: the activation of the prime spreads
to semantically related concepts, thus reducing the time required to activate them. These
semantic priming tasks inspired social psychologists to measure social attitudes without using
self-report, by measuring semantic associations between certain words (positive versus
negative, stereotypic versus non-stereotypic) and social groups. Although many different tasks
were later developed in the field of implicit bias, the underlying principle is the same: the more
two concepts are associated in a person’s mind, the faster the person is at responding to a
variety of quick decisions which pair those two concepts together.
It is important to note that there is some controversy in the literature about the terms
used to describe these implicit concepts and their measures. For example, Greenwald and Banaji
(1995) are very comprehensive in their definition of these terms and equate the explicit-implicit
dichotomy with terms such as conscious-unconscious, aware-unaware, direct-indirect, and
controlled-automatic. Other researchers contend that there is not enough evidence to call the
implicit measures unconscious, unaware, or automatic, and suggest that most of these measures
are just indirect measures (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Gawronski, LeBel, & Peters, 2007) – meaning

5
that participants are usually unaware that their attitudes are being measured, but not necessarily
unaware of their attitudes. In the remainder of this manuscript, I will use the terms “implicit,” as
it is widely used and accepted in the literature.

Theoretical Models of Implicit Bias
Despite Fazio and Olsen’s (2003) claim that the implicit bias literature is largely nontheoretical, but methodologically and empirically driven, there are several theoretical models in
the literature that explain the relationship between implicit and explicit attitudes. In most part,
these are dual-processing models, which address the issues of automatic versus controlled
processing in forming attitudes about social groups.
One of the first dual-processing models and empirical studies in the field of stereotyping
and prejudice comes from Patricia Devine in 1989. Devine makes a distinction between
knowledge of stereotypes and endorsement of stereotypes. Knowledge of stereotypes is
associated with automatic processing and has its source in the unintentional activation of welllearned associations derived from cultural stereotypes. Endorsement of stereotypes is associated
with controlled processing – a person can either consciously endorse or reject those cultural
stereotypic associations. As such, both low- and high-prejudice participants would show similar
levels of implicit bias. For both groups, whether they endorse it or not, the cultural stereotype of
Blacks would be activated when encountering a Black person. Thus, the difference between
high- and low-prejudice individuals lies in the overlap between their implicit and explicit
associations and beliefs. For low-prejudice individuals, there is little overlap between implicit
and explicit attitudes, as these individuals consciously reject the negative associations derived
from the cultural stereotype. High-prejudice individuals, on the other hand, show a greater
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overlap, as they consciously endorse the cultural stereotype. These hypotheses were supported
by several of Devine’s studies. For example, in one study, both high- and low-prejudice
participants rated a man’s ambiguous behavior as more hostile after being primed with the
Black stereotype of hostility compared to a condition in which they were not primed with this
stereotype. This finding suggests that stereotypes are automatically activated and used in
impression formation, regardless of participants’ level of explicit prejudice.
Devine’s model was later challenged by Fazio’s MODE model of attitude behavior
processes (Fazio & Towels-Schwen, 1999). Also a dual-processing model, this theoretical
framework differentiates between controlled, theory-driven processing and spontaneous, datadriven processing. Fazio and his colleague propose that whether a person engages in automatic
or controlled processing depends on two factors: motivation and opportunity (hence the name of
the model: Motivation and Opportunity as DEterminants). Motivation refers to a personal
motivation to be accurate and to reduce negative consequences when processing social
information. Opportunity refers to the time and resources to deliberate. The greater the
motivation and opportunity, the more likely an individual is to engage in controlled, deliberate
processing. When applied to racial prejudice, the MODE model predicts that we not only differ
in the extent to which we explicitly endorse stereotypes, as Devine (1989) suggested, but we
also differ in the degree to which we have implicit stereotypes. Fazio and Towels-Schwen
regard these automatic structures as personal attitudes, and not shared attitudes and stereotypes,
as suggested by Devine. In a series of studies, Fazio and his colleagues investigated the
hypothesis that motivation and opportunity moderate the relationship between implicit and
explicit racial attitudes. Their finding show that as motivation to control prejudice decreased,
the positive relationship between explicit and implicit bias grew stronger. For those who had
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positive implicit racial attitudes, motivation mattered very little. However, for those with
negative automatic attitudes, motivation played a large role in determining their explicit
attitudes, such that they had impressively positive explicit attitudes towards Blacks. Thus,
contrary to Devine (1989), Fazio and his colleagues found that individuals not only differ in
their explicit, but also implicit attitudes.
More recently, Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006) proposed a comprehensive model
that combines several characteristics of past models. According to their APE model, there are
two types of processing styles – Associative and Propositional Evaluations. Associative
evaluations are automatic affective reactions that do not require cognitive capacity or intention.
They are independent of the assignment of truth values and are not necessarily personally
endorsed. Propositional evaluations are cognitive judgments, which are superordinate to the
associative store, meaning that this propositional system can take associations and transform
them into propositional processes, subjecting them to validity checks. Gawronski and
Bodenhausen thus propose that associative judgments can be a source of evaluative judgments,
but, more importantly, that this relationship is bidirectional, such that propositions can be a
source of associations too. The mere knowledge of a proposition endorsed by other people, even
if it is deemed invalid by the person, can contribute to the activation of corresponding
associations in memory. This view is more consistent with Devine’s (1989) postulation that
negative stereotypes can be activated regardless of a person’s conscious endorsement of these
associations. Regarding the conscious-unconscious debate in explicit-implicit attitudes, the APE
model suggests that although explicit attitudes tend to be conscious, and implicit attitudes
unconscious, implicit affective associations can sometimes be in a person’s awareness. Finally,
Gawronski and Bodenhausen claim that both implicit and explicit attitudes are online
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constructions, such that they are not stable representations, but instead formed and modified
online depending on the context.
The theory behind dual-process models is not the only focus of the implicit bias
literature. Also of interest is the effort to differentiate between various types of implicit biases
and their measures. For example, Amodio and Devine (2006) suggest that commonly used
implicit measures usually assess two independent constructs: implicit stereotyping and implicit
evaluations (attitudes), and that this distinction has important consequences for these measures’
ability to predict behavior. Implicit stereotyping is a cognitive construct, based on semantic
learning and memory. It entails associating different social groups (e.g., African Americans)
with stereotypic traits (e.g., lazy, uneducated, athletic, religious). These semantic associations
are independent of affective or evaluative associations (positive or negative). Implicit evaluation
is an affective construct, based on reward and punishment cues. It entails associating social
groups (e.g., African Americans) with positive or negative evaluative words (e.g., cancer,
death), which are usually independent of semantic associations. Social neuroscience findings
support the independence of these two constructs (see Amodio, 2008, for a review). Implicit
stereotyping is usually localized in neocortical structures such as the prefrontal cortex, an area
usually associated with semantic processing. Implicit evaluations are localized in the amygdala,
an area usually associated with affective processes.

Measures of Implicit Bias
Sequentially primed decision tasks. Many implicit bias measures are computer-based
tasks that measure participants’ response time to a sequentially primed decision task. For
example, in the person categorization task (Blair & Banaji, 1996), participants are presented
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briefly with a trait (either positive or negative and either Black stereotypic or non-stereotypic),
followed by a photo of either a Black or a White man. Their task is to decide as quickly as
possible whether the person in the photo is Black or White, by pressing designated keys on the
keyboard. Their response time to this decision is recorded in milliseconds. Participants exhibit
automatic activation of negative Black stereotypes if they are faster at correctly categorizing
Black compared to White photos after being primed with negative Black stereotypic traits. In a
similar paradigm, the lexical decision task (Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997), the trait and
photo presentation is reversed, such that participants have to decide quickly whether certain
traits are words or non-words after being primed with Black and White-related stimuli, such as
words, symbols, or pictures. Faster response times to categorizing negative Black-stereotypic
traits after being primed with Black versus White photos suggests automatic activation of
negative Black stereotypes. For both of these tasks, the underlying logic is similar: faster
response times to categorization decisions suggest that the stereotypical trait and the target are
part of a common semantic network, which facilitates rapid decision making.
The opposite of facilitation, namely inhibition, is the underlying principle of a different
task, the modified Stroop task (Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, & Russin, 2000).
Participants are presented with a category prime (e.g., “elderly” and “skinhead”) followed by
elderly and skinhead stereotypes, presented in different colors on the screen. Participants’ task
is to state the color of the word into a microphone. In the Kawakami and colleagues study,
several dependent measures were recorded, such as response time to naming the color and errors
in naming the color. The latter included stutters, mispronunciations, stating the wrong color, or
changes in voice characteristics. To the extent that the elderly stereotype was activated in
response to the category prime, participants should take longer and/or make more errors in
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naming the color of the elderly-stereotypic word, due to inhibition coming from the activation
of the elderly stereotype.
By far, the most common implicit measure employed by social psychologists is the
Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Similar to other tests,
the IAT assesses the degree of association between social groups (e.g., male/female) and certain
concepts (e.g., good/bad), by measuring participants’ reaction times to categorizing items of
each category. For example, the gender attitude IAT uses trials in which participants categorize
words (e.g., he, she, flower, filth) into pairs of categories displayed on each side of the screen,
such as “Male or Good” on the left side and “Female or Bad” on the right side. The more that
participants associate men with positive characteristics and women with negative
characteristics, the faster they are at categorizing the items, compared to other trials in which the
category pairings are switched on the computer screen.
A more specific task is the weapons identification task (Payne, 2001), designed to
measure the degree of association between racial groups and weapons. Participants categorize
pictures of weapons or hand tools after being primed with photos of Black and White
individuals. Both response time and accuracy measures showed racial bias in the perception of
weapons, such that participants who were primed with Black versus White photos were faster to
identify a gun and were more likely to misidentify a tool as a gun.
Correll and his colleagues (Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002) proposed a
similar, although more ecologically valid method of measuring racial bias in relation to
decisions to shoot. In their shooter task paradigm, participants are presented with pictures of
Black and White men carrying either guns or objects other than guns (cell phones, wallets).
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Their task is to press a button labeled “Shoot” whenever the target is carrying a gun and a
button labeled “Don’t shoot” whenever the target is carrying an object other than a gun. In
several studies, participants showed a racial shooter bias both in terms of hits (correctly
shooting an armed target) and false alarms (incorrectly shooting an unarmed target). In short,
participants were faster to shoot Black compared to White armed targets and more likely to
inaccurately shoot Black compared to White unarmed targets.
Memory tasks. Given that implicit bias means automatically associating social groups
with certain negative traits, one way to measure bias would be to measure spontaneous trait
inferences (STIs) - how people infer the causes of other’s behaviors, by using certain traits.
Several studies (Lupfer, Clark, Church, DePaola, McDonald, 1995; Stewart, Weeks, & Lupfer,
2003; Uleman, Hon, Roman, & Moskowitz, 1996a) showed that people tend to spontaneously
make trait inferences about others’ behaviors, especially when the behavior is consistent with
the stereotype of the group that the person belongs to (Wigboldus, Sherman, Franzese, & van
Knippenberg, 2004). One way to study STIs is the probe recognition task (McKoon & Ratcliff,
1986). In this task, participants are presented with several behavioral sentences, such as “Larry
lost his job.” After each sentence a probe word is presented on the screen. Participants’ task is
to decide whether the word appeared in the sentence or not. On the experimental trials, the
probe is a trait that was implied by the behavioral sentence, such as “incompetent.” This probe
did not actually appear in the sentence, so the correct answer is “NO.” Participants also respond
to a control probe, which did not appear and was not implied by the sentence. To the extent that
the trait inference was spontaneously activated when reading the behavioral sentence,
participants should have a harder time responding correctly to the trait compared to the control
probe. Previous studies using this task found that people tend to spontaneously make trait
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inferences, as suggested by both accuracy data – being more likely to identify incorrectly that a
trait appeared in the sentence compared to a control (Lupfer et al., 1995; Stewart et al, 2003;
Uleman et al, 1996a) and reaction time data– being slower to reject a trait compared to a control
(Uleman et al, 1996a, Wigboldus et al., 2004).
Research also looked at whether people tend to spontaneously make situational
inferences (SSIs) of others’ behaviors. With some caveats, previous findings suggest that people
can spontaneously infer situational cues of behaviors (Duff & Newman, 1997, Lupfer et al.,
1995). In a more recent study, Ham and Vonk (2003) found that trait and situational inferences
can co-occur for the same behavior. They used an adaptation of the probe recognition task, in
which participants were tested not only on traits probes but also on situational probes that had
not been seen in the sentences. For example, a situational probe for “Larry lost his job” would
be “downsizing.” In one study, Ham and Vonk found that participants responded slower to both
trait and situational probes compared to control probes, thus suggesting co-occurring activation
of both trait and situational inferences.
Another implicit bias assessment paradigm is the “Who said what” paradigm, proposed
by Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, and Ruderman (1978). Originally, this task was designed to measure
categorization processes in social perception. Participants were presented with a slide
containing a discussion of different topics. The slides featured six speakers, each of which
presumably made six statements. In one study (Taylor et al., Study 1), three of the speakers
were White and three were Black. After the presentation, participants were asked to match each
statement with the picture of the person who had made it. Two measures were assessed: the
extent to which participants made within-group errors (e.g., wrongfully attributing a statement
made by a White person to another White person) and between-group errors (e.g., wrongfully

13
attributing a statement made by a White person to a Black person). Participants were more
likely to make within compared to between-group errors, thus showing categorization by race.
In a more recent study, Coats, Latu and Haydel (2006) adapted the “who said what” paradigm to
measure implicit racial bias. In one condition, the majority of the behaviors performed by the
Black targets were unfavorable, while the majority of the behaviors performed by White targets
were favorable. In a second condition, the favorability was reversed, with most Black targets
performing positive behaviors, and most White targets performing negative behaviors. Results
showed that participants made more within-group errors in the unfavorable Black condition
compared to the unfavorable White condition, thus supporting the idea that categorization was
facilitated by exposures to negative stereotypes of Blacks.
Affect Misattribution Procedure. Payne, Cheng, Govorun, and Stewart (2005)
developed the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP) to measure implicit affective bias
towards different groups and targets. Also a sequential priming task, this measure is different
than previous ones because it directly asks participants to state their feelings toward ambiguous
stimuli. For example, Payne and colleagues (Experiment 6) primed participants with Black and
White photos, before presenting them with Chinese ideographs. Participants’ task was to
evaluate the symbol as being pleasant or unpleasant, using different keys on the computer
keyboard. To the extent that participants experience negative affect in response to Black faces,
this affect should be misattributed to the ambiguous stimulus that follows it, thus influencing
judgments.
Psychophysiological Measures. Several physiological measures have been used to
detect implicit bias. These include fMRI to measure amygdala activation (Phelps, O’Connor,
Cunnigham, Funayama, Gatenby et. al, 2000), eyeblink startle responses to Black versus White
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faces (Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Devine, 2002), and event-related potentials in response to
Black versus White faces (Ito & Caccioppo, 2000). However, probably the most commonly
used physiological measure of implicit racial bias is facial electromyography (EMG), which
involves measuring the activity of two facial muscles: the corrugator (frowning) muscle and the
zygomaticus (smiling) muscle. Greater zygomaticus and lesser corrugator activity indicate
positive affect and greater corrugator and lesser zygomaticus activity indicate negative affect. In
three studies, Vanman, Paul, Ito, & Miller (1997) found a discrepancy between White
participants’ self-reported attitudes towards Blacks and their EMG activity: while participants
generally reported positive attitudes on explicit measures, their EMG activity reflected negative
affective attitudes toward Black targets. Unlike other psychophysiological assessments, this
measure has the advantage of capturing both the valence and the intensity of the participant’s
reaction.

Implicit Bias and Behavior
The existence of implicit bias may only be important to the extent that it causes
negative, harmful behaviors toward certain groups. Thus, one important question is whether
implicit stereotyping and prejudice are able to predict discriminatory behavior. There are
numerous studies that investigate this question and most findings show that implicit measures
are more likely to predict subtle, nonverbal behaviors than overt discriminatory behaviors. For
example, McConnell and Leibold (2001) found that negative implicit attitudes toward Blacks
significantly correlated with a number of negative nonverbal behaviors exhibited towards a
Black experimenter compared to a White experimenter, such as speaking and smiling less,
displaying more speech errors and hesitations. Participants’ implicit attitudes and nonverbal
behaviors correlated both when assessed by the Black experimenter and independent judges.
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Dovidio, Kawakami, and Gaertner (2002) extended these findings and showed that in an
interaction with a Black confederate, White participants’ explicit attitudes predicted their verbal
friendliness, but not their nonverbal friendliness. However, participants’ implicit attitudes
predicted confederates’ ratings of the participants’ nonverbal friendliness. The predictive power
of implicit attitudes has been demonstrated not only for racial groups, but also other social
groups. For example, Bessenoff and Sherman (2000) showed that participants’ implicit
associations of fat people predicted how far they chose to sit near a fat person in a potential
interaction, such that more negative automatic attitudes were associated with sitting farther from
a fat woman’s belongings. Surprisingly, biased associations also seem to have an effect on
participants’ own behavior. For example, Dijksterhuis, Arts, Bargh, and van Knippenberg
(2000) found that associating elderly people with forgetfulness predicted participants’ own
memory impairment, regardless of their own age.
Although implicit measures are best known for predicting subtle, spontaneous outcomes
such as nonverbal behavior, some studies have found that they also predict overtly
discriminatory behavior. For example, in organizational contexts, a gender IAT predicted
budget cuts for racial and ethnic minority organizations (Rudman & Ashmore, 2007) and
discriminatory hiring recommendations for Black applicants (Ziegert & Hanges, 2005). Rudman
and Glick (2001) also found that associating men, more than women, with agentic
characteristics predicted workplace discrimination, such that agentic female, but not male
candidates, received negative evaluations when applying for a feminized job. In a more recent
study, Latu, Stewart, Myers, Lisco, Estes, and Donahue (in press) found that associating men,
more than women, with successful manager characteristics predicted higher salary
recommendations for male, but not for female candidates.
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Overall, implicit measures seem to consistently show high predictive validity. One
important research question is whether implicit measures show significantly higher predictive
validity compared to self-report measures. Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, and Banji (2009)
sought to answer this question by conducting a meta-analysis on 184 published and unpublished
studies. Studies included in the meta-analysis investigated the relationship between IAT scores
and behaviors in different domains such as consumer preference, interracial behavior,
personality differences, alcohol and drug use, clinical phenomena, non-racial intergroup
behavior, gender and sexual orientation, close relationships and political preferences. Findings
showed that the predictive power of implicit versus explicit measure depended on the domain in
which the behavior occurred. Both implicit and explicit attitudes reliably predicted behaviors in
the domain of consumer and political preference. However, in the more sensitive domain of
racial and intergroup interaction, the IAT had significantly greater predictive validity compared
to explicit measures.
Another distinction relevant to the predictive power of implicit measures comes from
Amodio and Devine (2006), who suggested that implicit stereotyping and implicit evaluation
differentially predict behaviors in the domain of interracial interactions. Specifically, implicit
stereotyping primarily predicts stereotypic expectations that people have when encountering a
target. For example, in two studies, a racial stereotyping IAT significantly predicted the extent
to which participants rated an African American target using stereotypic traits, but it did not
predict approach-avoidance behaviors. On the contrary, a racial evaluative IAT significantly
predicted consumatory behaviors such as seating distance and ratings on a feeling thermometer,
but it did not predict stereotypic expectations.
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Implicit Bias Reduction
Once researchers reliably documented implicit biases towards different social groups
and established that these biases can predict behavior, the focus of research shifted towards
identifying successful strategies of reducing implicit intergroup bias. These attempts were
initially met with skepticism, as it was assumed that these associations are hard to change
because they are automatic, deeply rooted, and outside a person’s control (Bargh, 1994; Devine,
1989). However, research conducted in the past twenty years has successfully identified several
strategies of reducing implicit bias.
Changing Associations. Given that implicit bias involves associating social groups with
negative stereotypic traits or words that are generally negative in valence, one strategy of
reducing this negativity involves changing these underlying associations, a strategy that has
become “the Holy Grail of implicit race bias research,” as Amodio and Mendoza (in press, p.
23) suggest. Techniques of changing these stereotypes include promoting positive
counterstereotypes and suppressing existing stereotypic associations.
Counterstereotypes. Exposing participants to counterstereotypes in order to reduce
negative intergroup bias was one of the first strategies attempted by researchers. For example, in
a series of studies Blair, Ma, and Lenton (2001) had participants engage in a mental imagery
task, in which they were instructed to imagine either a strong woman or, in control conditions, a
weak woman or a vacation in the Caribbean. Across several implicit gender bias measures,
participants who imagined a counterstereotypical strong woman, compared to those engaged in
a control imagery task, showed reduced automatic gender stereotyping, such that participants
were less likely to associate women, compared to men, with words indicating weakness.
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In a later study, Dasgupta and Asgari (2004) found that imagining famous women in
high-status positions such as business leaders, scientists, and judges led to being more likely to
associate women with leadership characteristics compared to a control condition in which
participants were exposed to pictures of flowers. A second study conducted by Dasgupta and
Asgari looked at the role of counterstereoyptes in a naturalistic environment, by studying
implicit gender attitudes in students enrolled either in a coed college or a women’s college,
where women occupy most high-powered positions in the college hierarchy. Findings showed
that although women enrolled at a women’s college and coed college had the same implicit
gender attitudes when they enrolled, after a year, women’s college students had more positive
implicit attitudes compared to coed students, presumably because they have been exposed to
positive counterstereotypic models (e.g., female professors). Findings also showed that the
frequency of interaction with strong female role models moderated implicit bias reduction
effect, such that the more classes students attended, the larger was their reduction in implicit
gender bias.
The role of counterstereotypes has not only been studied in the realm of implicit gender
bias. In the domain of racial implicit bias, Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001) found less negativity
towards Black targets after participants were exposed to an admired Black person compared to a
disliked person or a control. These effects were maintained after a 24 hour delay.
Suppression of stereotypes. One strategy to reduce stereotyping is to train
participants to negate or suppress current stereotypic associations. Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll,
Hermsen, and Russin (2000) designed a negation training, in which participants’ task was to
repeatedly negate skinhead, elderly, or racial stereotypes. Compared to controls who either did
not undergo training or were trained in stereotype maintenance, participants showed reduced
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automatic stereotype activation, such that they no longer showed facilitation of categorizing
Black and White faces after being primed with Black and White stereotypes respectively.
Subsequently, Kawakami, Dovidio, and van Kamp (2005) showed that a variation of this
training led to reduced stereotype application in a resume evaluation task, as long as participants
were not deliberately trying to avoid being influenced by negation training.
Several criticisms were brought up in response to the Kawakami et al. (2000) negation
training. Gawronski, Deutsch, Mbirkou, Seibt, and Strack (2008) argued that the negated
stereotype (e.g., “Black NO loud”) can not be stored in memory at an automatic level as such,
and thus can actually lead to increased stereotype activation (“Black” was still repeatedly paired
with “loud”). Instead, Gawronski and colleagues argue, the reduced stereotype activation effects
of the Kawakami training technique are probably due to affirming the counterstereotype, thus
forming a new automatic association in participants’ minds (e.g. “Black quiet”). Another issue
to consider about negation training is the potentially antagonistic effect of stereotype
suppression. Several studies showed that stereotype negation might ironically lead to increased
stereotyping (Galinski & Moskowitz, 2000; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994). For
example, Macrae and colleagues found that compared to controls, participants who were asked
to suppress skinhead stereotypes while constructing a story about a skinhead showed more
automatic stereotype activation on a lexical decision task. The authors suggested that this
finding was due to a rebound effect – suppressing unwanted thoughts is likely to lead to an
increased chance of their reappearance later on. Although the training technique designed by
Kawakami and colleagues showed no such rebound effects after 24 hours, it is important to note
that stereotype negation may, in certain circumstances, lead to increased stereotype activation.
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Changing motivation and goals.
Self-enhancement. One important motivation for social action is the
maintenance of a positive self-image. Research shows that such self-enhancement motives can
also affect the magnitude of implicit intergroup bias. Sinclair and Kunda (1999) conducted
several studies in which non-Black students completed implicit measures of racial stereotyping
after receiving either positive or negative feedback from either a Black or a White professional.
For example, in one study, participants received videotaped positive or negative evaluations
from either a Black or a White manager. Compared to participants who received positive
feedback from a White manager, participants who received positive feedback from a Black
manager showed reduced negativity towards Blacks. Presumably, these participants were
motivated to think highly of a manager who praised them, in order to maintain and validate a
positive image of themselves. On the contrary, participants who received negative feedback
from a Black target showed high levels of implicit racial bias, as they were motivated to
disparage an evaluator who threatened their self-image. Thus, the promotion of a positive selfimage does not only affect explicit bias, as predicted by the Social Identity Theory (Tajfel &
Turner, 1979), but it also affects intergroup bias at an automatic level.
Social tuning. Individuals’ need to belong in social groups and situations often
determines them to engage in social tuning – an attempt to adjust attitudes, beliefs, and even
memories, to fit with others’ perspective, in order to achieve a common ground. Lowery,
Hardin, and Sinclair (2001) were interested in how social tuning affects automatic racial
attitudes. In past research, social tuning was evident at an explicit prejudice level. For example,
participants expressed less explicit racial prejudice when interviewed by a Black compared to a
White experimenter (Kinder & Sanders, 1996). However, this finding may be attributed to
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social desirability effects, and not necessarily to a true change in prejudiced feelings. Lowery
and colleagues challenged the social desirability view and showed that social tuning is also an
efficient strategy of reducing bias at an automatic level. In several experiments, White
participants showed less automatic negativity towards Black targets in the presence of a Black
experimenter compared to a White experimenter.
Later experiments suggested that individuals tend to tune not only to others’ mere
presence, but also to others’ attitudes. In one study, Sinclair, Lowery, Hardin, and Colangelo
(2005) revealed that female participants showed reduced automatic prejudice towards Blacks
when the experimenter was wearing a t-shirt that expressed social equality message, compared
to a neutral t-shirt. Further analyses suggested that this relationship was moderated by how
much participants liked the experimenter. Thus, it seems that affiliative motivation, especially
when encountering liked others, can reduce automatic bias. This finding was supported in a
second experiment conducted by Sinclair and colleagues. In this study, likability was directly
manipulated, by having the experimenter behave in either a likable or rude way towards the
participant. Findings revealed that participants were less likely to have anti-Black attitudes
when a likable experimenter was wearing an anti-racism t-shirt, compared to a neutral t-shirt.
This difference did not occur for participants exposed to a rude experimenter. Taken together,
these findings suggest that participants adjust their automatic attitudes when exposed to
egalitarian messages coming from liked individuals, as a way of social tuning, with the ultimate
goal of belonging to social groups.
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Changing experience.
Contact with the target. For more than 50 years, social psychologists have been
interested in testing the hypothesis that intergroup contact decreases prejudice. These efforts
were initiated by Allport (1954), who proposed that contact between different social groups
could effectively reduce prejudice if four conditions are satisfied: the groups are of equal status
in the contact situation, the groups have common goals, the interaction is cooperative in nature,
and the interaction receives the support of authorities. Over 500 studies showed support for the
intergroup contact hypothesis, as suggested by Pettigrew and Tropp’s recent metaanalysis
(2006). Across a large range of groups and contact settings, intergroup contact decreased
explicit, self-reported intergroup bias. But does intergroup contact also have the power to
reduce implicit intergroup bias? Henry and Hardin (2006) conducted two studies to investigate
this hypothesis, and the results were somewhat optimistic. Their findings showed that contact
reduced implicit bias, but only for low-status groups. More contact was associated with less
implicit bias, but only for Black and not for White participants. The same pattern was found for
intergroup contact between Christians and Muslims in Beirut: more contact was associated with
less implicit prejudice for Muslims (low-status group), but not for Christians (high-status
group). These findings are probably due to low-status deference: low-status groups are
motivated to maintain positive (explicit and implicit) views of high status groups. Also,
differences in information processing may predict differential automatic stereotypes between
the two status groups. Individuals from high-status groups tend to be heuristic (and thus
stereotypical) when they encounter individuals from low-status groups. In contrast, low-status
individuals are motivated to carefully process information about high-status individuals, and are
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thus more mindful and less stereotypical (Fiske, 1993, Keltner, Gruenfeld, and Anderson,
2003).
Perspective taking. Several studies suggested that taking the perspective of stigmatized
targets can reduce explicit negative attitudes towards the entire stigmatized group (Batson et al.,
1997; Dovidio et al., 2004; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucci, 2003).
The effects of perspective taking seem to also extend to implicit intergroup bias. For example,
Galinsky and Moskowitz found that taking the perspective of others, by imagining what the
person feels, led to reduced automatic stereotype activation on a lexical decision task.
The context in which the target is perceived. True to the fundamental idea of the power
of the situation in social psychology, automatic stereotyping also depends on the context in
which the target person is perceived. Wittenbrink, Judd, and Park (2001) found reduced
automatic stereotype activation for participants who saw a clip of a Black person in a positive
context such as family barbecue, compared to a negative context such as a gang incident. In
another study, participants showed more positive associations of Blacks when pictures of Black
individuals were presented in a church background compared to a graffiti street corner.
Changing attributions. As early as 1954, Allport suggested that the ways in which we
explain others’ behaviors have important consequences for intergroup relations. His ideas were
later extended and refined by Pettigrew (1979), who was inspired by research on the
fundamental attribution error (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Ross, 1977), which showed that people
tend to overly rely on internal, dispositional factors when explaining behaviors, while
underestimating situational factors that could explain the same behaviors. Pettigrew extended
this attribution tendency to the intergroup domain, and coined the term the ultimate attribution
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error to describe an ethnocentric pattern of attributions, in which negative behaviors of outgroup members, especially if stereotype-consistent, are explained in terms of dispositional or
internal factors. This tendency to underestimate situational constraints for out-group members is
still pervasive in today’s society. For example, people who use this attribution pattern may
attribute Black people’s criminality rate to their innate aggressiveness, women’s professional
lack of success to their incompetence, and poor people’s unemployment to their unwillingness
to get a job. Individual’s tendency to engage in the ultimate attribution error has been supported
by empirical research. For example, Duncan (1976) found that White participants attributed the
same aggressive shove to dispositional factors when the actor was Black, and to situational
factors when the actor was White.
The ultimate attribution error is highly relevant for intergroup relations and stereotyping.
Consistent with Pettigrew’s predictions, this ethnocentric pattern of attribution tends to be
enhanced for highly prejudiced individuals (Greenberg & Rosenfield, 1979; Wittenbrink, Gist,
& Hilton, 1997) and for groups that have a history of conflict and stereotyped views of each
other (see Hewstone, 1990 for a review). The mechanism through which this pattern of
attributions perpetuates negative stereotypes is straightforward: when the negative behavior of
an out-group members is attributed to internal factors (e.g. He was fired from his job because he
is incompetent), while underestimating situational constraints (the declining job market), then it
is very likely that the negative stereotypes about the out-group are reinforced and perpetuated.
For example, Brescoll and Uhlmann (2008) showed that women who express anger are
accorded lower status than men, and this relationship was mediated by internal attributions of
anger expression (e.g., women express anger because they are out of control, men express anger
because their situation is aggravating).
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Existing research seems to indirectly suggest that situational attributions for out-group
members’ behaviors may underlie implicit bias reduction. Stewart et al. (2010) designed a novel
training technique aimed at reducing racial stereotyping by changing attributions – the basic
pillars on which stereotyping stands. This technique, called Situational Attribution Training, had
participants replace dispositional, stereotypic explanations with situational explanations of
undesirable behaviors of Black men. The findings of two experiments showed that repeated
training in making situational attributions for negative stereotypic behaviors of out-group
members led to decreased automatic stereotype activation. Across two experiments, participants
were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the Situational Attribution Training
condition participants repeatedly chose situational over dispositional explanations of stereotypic
negative behaviors presumably performed by Black males. Depending on the experiment,
control participants either did nothing (No Training Control condition) or completed a similar
task to Situational Attribution Training, but instead of choosing situational over dispositional
explanations, they had to count the number of nouns and verbs in the behavioral sentences
(Grammar Training Control condition). Finally, all participants completed the Person
Categorization Task (Blair & Banaji, 1996) as measure of automatic stereotype activation. This
task required participants to categorize quickly White and Black photos after being primed with
positive and negative traits that were stereotypic either of Blacks or of Whites. Across two
studies, control participants who did not undergo Situational Attribution Training categorized
Black photos significantly faster than White photos after being primed with a Black negative
stereotype, thus showing automatic stereotype activation of Blacks. However, experimental
participants who completed Situational Attribution Training no longer showed facilitation of
categorizing Black faces compared to White faces after being primed with negative Black
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stereotypic traits. In other words, the two studies showed consistent evidence that extensive
training in making situational attributions for negative behaviors decreases the automatic
association between Black negative stereotypes and Black targets. In Allport’s words, the
Stewart et al. training technique “strenuously disciplined” individuals’ tendency to engage in
the ultimate attribution error and consistent with Allport’s suggestion, this strategy led to
reduced intergroup bias.
Although Stewart et al. (2010) was the first to document the causal relationship between
situational attributions and stereotype reduction, another study came close to accomplishing that
goal. Designed as a statistical training, Schaller, Asp, Rosell, and Heim (1996) taught
participants the logic behind analysis of covariance and how it applies to our explanation of
everyday outcomes. In one condition, participants learned how to take into account situational
factors that may determine the racial achievement gap on standardized tests. Compared to
controls, participants who underwent training were less likely to show stereotyping of minimal
groups in a subsequent task. However it should be noted that situational attributions were only
one of the components of the covariance training. In addition, the study did not document the
effects of training on implicit stereotypes, or on racial stereotypes, as did Stewart and colleagues
in the Situational Attribution Training studies.
Automaticity and Social Inferences
Automatic and Controlled Processes in Social Cognition
Any process, be it driving a car or making an impression of a new person we meet,
usually ranges between two poles: automatic and controlled. In controlled processes, the person
is in control of their thoughts, feelings, or behaviors. In automatic processes, this control is
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taken over by the environment, with little input from the person. According to Bargh (1994),
there are four characteristics that make a process automatic: unawareness, lack of intention,
efficiency, and lack of control. A person can be unaware of a certain mental process in several
ways. First, a person can be unaware of the presence of a certain stimulus, as is the case of
subliminal perception and priming. For example, Bargh and Pietromanco (1982) showed that
the more participants were primed subliminally with words related to hostility, the more likely
they were to interpret an ambiguous behavior as hostile. Second, even if a person is aware of a
stimulus, they can be unaware of how the stimulus influences certain mental processes, as is the
case in priming studies. For example, in the lexical decision task (Wittenbrink et al., 1997)
participants are unaware that the race of the photo they see on the screen may influence the
speed with which they decide whether subsequently presented (stereotypic) traits are words or
non-words. Finally, in automatic processes, individuals may be unaware of what exactly
determined a certain judgment or feeling, as is the case in the Affect Misattribution Procedure
(Payne et al., 2005), in which subjective judgments of ambiguous symbols are, without the
participants’ awareness, influenced by their feelings towards different racial groups to which
they have been exposed.
A second characteristic of automatic processes is their decreased intentionality, the
degree to which one is in control when it comes to initiating a certain process. A prime example
of unintentionality is automatic stereotype activation. For example, Devine’s famous studies
(1989) were among the first ones to show that Black stereotypes are unawarely activated by
exposure to African American traits, such that participants primed with these traits were more
likely to interpret ambiguous behaviors as hostile compared to participants who were not
primed.
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Efficiency is the third characteristic of automatic processes. According to Bargh, a
process is efficient to the extent to which it does not require a great deal of attentional resources.
For example, trait (dispositional) inferences in person perception are generally more cognitively
efficient compared to situational inferences, which require cognitive resources to be completed.
Finally, automatic processes are characterized by a relative lack of control, the extent to
which the person is in control of ending a particular process. According to several researchers,
motivations play an important part in moderating the degree of control that a person has over a
mental process: motivations to control prejudice (Bargh, 1994; Devine, 1989), need for
cognition (Bargh, 1994; Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999), or personal need for structure (Fiske et
al., 1999). Higher levels of these motivations are likely to increase control over certain
processes.
Traditionally, mental processes have been viewed as either automatic or controlled.
However, more recently, researchers have emphasized the need to view automaticity as a
continuum. As such, a process can never be purely automatic or controlled. Instead, it varies in
the degree to which it has automatic and controlled components. For example, stereotype
activation has both automatic components (e.g., racial stereotypes are often unawarely activated
in the presence of a target person; Devine, 1989) and controlled components (e.g., stereotypes
require some attentional resources to be activated; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). Related to person
perception, Fiske et al. (1999) proposed a continuum model, with category-based (automatic)
processes at one end of the continuum and individuating (controlled) processes at the other end.
Fiske and her colleagues maintain that perceivers give priority to category-based processes
because they are quicker and more efficient than individuating processes. However, several
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factors, such as motivation and availability of information can attenuate this tendency, pushing
processes towards the more controlled end of this continuum.

Assessing Automaticity in Social Cognition
Cognitive load. A common way to study the degree to which a process is automatic is
to limit participants’ cognitive resources while performing the task of interest, by having them
engage in a competing cognitive task (Navon & Gopher, 1979). If the process is automatic, then
the competing cognitive task should not disrupt performance on the primary task. If the process
is not automatized, the cognitive task should disrupt individuals’ performance, suggesting that
the process requires some attentional resources. Several cognitive load tasks have been
employed in the cognitive and social literature. These include monitoring flashing lights
(Osterhaus & Brock, 1970) or Xs (Petty, Wells, & Brock, 1976) on a screen, with distraction
level being manipulated by increasing the rate of flashing stimuli. Another cognitive load task
involves engaging participants in competing listening tasks, such as tracking musical tone
changes (Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson & Chamberlin, 2002), listening to music and
keeping track of the number of songs played (Lalwani, 2009), indicating each time a particular
sequence of tones was played (Gilbert, Gill, & Wilson, 2002), and hearing and repeating a story
recorded on a tape (Mikulincer, Birnbaum, Woddis, & Nachmias, 2000). Another line of
cognitive business tasks simply restricted participants’ window of responding in a decisionmaking task: Deutsch, Kordts-Freudinger, Gawronski, and Strack (2009) used the Affect
Missatribution Procedure and restricted participants’ response window to below 600ms (high
load) or above 600ms (low load). Gilbert and Gill (2000) also used time pressure in decision
making, by allowing participants either 2 seconds (high load) or 10 seconds (low load) to make
a decision of whether they had seen a stimulus before or not.
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By far, the most popular cognitive load task in social cognition has been the Gilbert and
Hixon (1991) procedure of having participants memorize numbers while performing the task of
interest. In the high cognitive load conditions, participants are presented with five to eight digit
numbers at the beginning of the task, and asked to memorize the digits, because they would
have to recall them at the end of the task. In the low cognitive load condition, participants
memorize and recall one digit numbers. Presumably, participants silently rehearse the digits
while completing the main task, with more digits being associated with more cognitive
business. Although this is the main paradigm, several variations of this paradigm exist in the
social cognition literature. A summary of cognitive load manipulations using the Gilbert and
Hixon paradigm is presented in Table 1.
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Table 1. Cognitive Load Manipulations in the Literature
Study

Osborne and Gilbert,
1990
(unpublished
manuscript)
Gilbert and Hixon,
1991

Sherman et al., 1998

Main findings

Participants responded
slower to probes 2 minutes
after load, so they were
probably rehearsing the
number
Cognitive business impairs
stereotype activation but it
stimulates stereotype
application
Under high cognitive load,
stereotype-inconsistent
information receives greater
attention

Pendry and Macrae,
1999
Sherman and Frost,
2000

Koole et al., 2001

Under high cognitive load,
recall is better for
stereotype-consistent info
(compared to inconsistent)
and recognition is better for
stereotype-inconsistent info
Implicit self-esteem predicts
positive self-evaluations
under high but not low cog
load

Task

Manipulation of Cognitive

Cutoff for

Reaction

Load

elimination

Times

20s to memorize 8-digit
number

N/A

N/A

Word-fragment
completion task

Memorize 8-digit number
and recall it at the end of the
task

4 or more errors

N/A

Impression
formation task –
read sentences,
reading time
recorded
Impression
formation task

Memorize 8-digit number

Participants not
eliminated
because they did
not make any
errors
N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Impression
formation task –
test recall and
recognition

Trait rating (“me”
or “not me”)

20s to memorize 8-digit
number and recall at the end
of task
Memorize 8-digit number
and recall it at the end of the
task

High load: memorize 8-digit
number; Low load:
memorize 1-digit number;
Recall at the end of the task

N/A
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Bodner and
Stalinski, 2008

Priming in the lexical
decision tasl is automatic,
and would endure under
high cognitive load.

Lexical Decision
Task

Memorize 8 digit number,
recognition tested after each
trial

N/A

RT no load <
RT load
- no
interaction
with priming
– same
effects under
load and no
load ->
automatic
Satisfaction
with
advantageous
inequity
higher under
high versus
low load

Van den Bos et al.,
2006

People are more satisfied
with advantageous inequity
under high versus low
cognitive load

Reading about a
hypothetical
situation and
rating their
satisfaction of the
outcome

High load: strings of 8
symbols @ * % # ? $ + and,
presented for 25 s, and then
asked to recall at the end of
the experimental procedure;
low load pp were just given
one symbol @.

N/A

Stewart et al., 2003

Participants spontaneously
stereotype, regardless of
level of prejudce

Probe Recognition
Task

N/A

N/A - only
accuracy
data

Wigboldus et al.,
2004

Under high load: STIs more Probe Recognition
likely for ster consistent vs
Task
inconsistent behaviors.
Under no load: no difference

High load: memorize 5-digit
number; low load – 1-digit
number; recall after each
trial
Study 1: memorize 8-digit
number at the beginning of
task, recall at the end
Study 2: high load – 5-digit
number; low load – 1-digit
number; recall at the end of
each trial.

4 or more; ran
analyses with
and without
those participant
– no difference –
so reported those
with error pp in

High load: ~
1030ms
Low load: ~
1010ms

Notes. Low load and no load seem to be interchangeable. Low load (one-digit number) seems to be used more in trial-by-trial recall
tasks than no load, probably to maintain load conditions somewhat equivalent.
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Cognitive load and implicit bias. As early as Allport’s initial writings on prejudice
(1954), social psychologists have agreed that social categorization and stereotyping serve the
function of organizing the social world into clear, well-known categories, thus increasing
cognitive economy. As Gilbert and Hixon wrote, “A stereotype is a sluggard’s best friend”
(1991, pp. 509). The consensus has been that if stereotypes serve such cognitive economy
purposes, reducing a perceiver’s cognitive resources should increase the tendency to stereotype.
Several studies have shown that when individuals are short on attentional resources, they are
more likely to rely on stereotypes and less likely to use individual information about the target
person (Bodenhausen, 1990). However, later studies (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Spencer, Fein,
Wolfe, Fong, & Dunn, 1998) found evidence of less stereotyping under conditions of high
compared to low cognitive load. Their findings suggest that cognitive business differentially
impacts stereotype activation versus stereotype application. Because stereotype activation is not
a fully automatic process and requires some cognitive resources to be completed, cognitive load
disrupted the activation of stereotypes, thus leading cognitively busy participants to make less
stereotyping word completions compared to participants who were not busy. However,
consistent with previous findings, the same participants showed more stereotype application
under high compared to low cognitive load.

Spontaneous Inferences
One interest of researchers is how people infer the causes of other people’s behaviors. If
we hear that Rick lost his job, we can infer that there’s something about Rick that got him fired
(he is not hard-working) or that there’s something about the situation that determined Rick to
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lose his job (the economy is in recession). Earlier social inference theories (e.g., Gilbert &
Malone, 1995) proposed that individuals initially attribute the causes of a behavior to internal or
trait factors. This tendency was called the fundamental attribution error or correspondence bias.
According to Gilbert and Malone, the inference process has three stages. First, the perceiver
categorizes the behavior. Second, the perceiver draws an internal, dispositional inference of that
behavior. A third stage involves correcting for the dispositional inference to take into account
situational factors. This stage is optional and it only occurs if the perceiver has sufficient
cognitive resources and motivation to make the correction. One implication of this model is that
the second stage of drawing the dispositional inference is somewhat automatic, occurring
without a person’s effort and awareness. However, the research paradigm used to assess the way
individuals make social inferences does not seem to adequately assess the automaticity of these
inferences. For example, in Gilbert, Pelham, and Krull (1988), participants are presented with a
videotape of a woman behaving anxiously. Afterwards, participants are asked whether the
woman behaved that way because she was nervous or because the situation was anxiety
provoking. This paradigm forces participants to make an intentional inference, and thus is not
adequate for assessing automatic social inferences.
A more appropriate paradigm for investigating the way people automatically infer the
causes of others’ behaviors comes from the spontaneous inference literature (see Uleman,
Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996b for a review), using the probe recognition task (McKoon &
Ratcliff, 1986). Unlike classic attributions, these spontaneous inferences occur without an
impression formation goal in mind. Instead, they are guided by chronically accessible
constructs. Because they are spontaneous, no cognitive effort is required in drawing these
inferences. For example, upon hearing that Rick lost his job, a perceiver may spontaneously
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think “incompetent,” thus making a spontaneous trait inference (STI). There is consistent
evidence (Lupfer, et al., 1995; Stewart et al., 2003; Uleman, et al., 1996a) that perceivers make
STIs without effort and without being motivated to do so. Some research also suggests that
people may also make spontaneous situational inferences (SSI) when perceiving a behavior
(Duff & Newman, 1997, Lupfer et al., 1995), and that STIs and SSIs can co-occur for the same
behavior (Ham & Vonk, 2003).
Bargh (1994) claimed that spontaneous inferences are almost fully automatic. Previous
research partially supports this claim. For example, Wigboldus and colleagues (2004) showed
that cognitively loading participants while completing the probe recognition task led to
impairments of STIs for stereotype inconsistent behaviors. Thus, it may be that spontaneous
inferences of stereotypic behaviors are more likely to lie towards the automatic end of the
continuum compared to those of nonstereotypic behaviors.

Individual Differences and Implicit Bias
There are several individual differences that moderate individuals’ implicit bias. These
moderators include explicit prejudice, motivations to control prejudice, and cognitive
complexity variables such as need for cognition and personal need for structure.

Explicit Prejudice
How does explicit prejudice relate to implicit bias? There has been a large debate in the
literature about the relationship between explicit and implicit attitudes. While some researchers
suggest there is not enough evidence to claim that explicit and implicit attitudes are
conceptually different (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Gawronski et al., 2007), others support the idea of

36
independent constructs (Nosek & Smyth, 2007). Research findings also seem to maintain this
controversy, with some explicit and implicit measures being significantly related to each other
and others being unrelated. For example, self-report measures of hostile sexism did not correlate
with several gender IATs, but benevolent sexism significantly correlated with some implicit
associations, such as associating men, more than women, with high status words and agentic
traits (Rudman & Kilianski, 2000). In other domains, Nosek and Smyth found that self-report
ratings significantly correlated with implicit ratings for attitudes towards gays, but not for
attitudes towards Blacks. Overall, findings seem to support the idea of construct independence.
Using a multitrait-multimethod design, Nosek and Smyth found that a dual-attitude factor
model of implicit and explicit attitudes fit significantly better than a single-attitude factor
model, thus supporting the idea of distinct attitude constructs.

Motivations to Control Prejudice
It is widely accepted that some societal norms discourage the expression of racial bias
and that people are less likely to express their prejudice beliefs in order to conform to these
norms. Researchers also proposed that motivations to be fair might stem not only from external
sources such as social norms, but also from internal sources, such as personal, internalized
beliefs about social equality and fairness. For example, Plant and Devine (1998) proposed that
there are two sources of motivation that determine people to control their prejudiced responses
to Black individuals. First, individuals may try to respond without prejudice because it is
personally important for them to foster non-prejudiced beliefs, thus relying on internal
motivations to control prejudice (IMS). Second, people may try to control their prejudiced
responses because they want to avoid being seen negatively by others – a concept named
external motivation to control prejudice (EMS). These two concepts are independent of each

37
other, and individuals may be characterized by high levels of either or both motivations. Across
several studies, Plant and Devine developed and established the convergent and discriminant
reliability of separate scales that measure IMS and EMS. Later research investigated how the
combination of these motivations was related to the level of implicit racial bias. In several
studies, Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, and Vance (2002) found that individuals high in
IMS and low in EMS displayed lower implicit racial bias than did individuals characterized by
any other IMS/EMS combination. These effects were maintained for several implicit bias
measures, such as a lexical decision task and the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998). Participants high
in IMS showed less implicit racial bias because their non-prejudiced beliefs became internalized
over time, thus leading to implicit positive attitudes toward Blacks. Those also low in EMS
were less likely to be concerned with how they looked to others and more likely to act and feel
according to their non-prejudiced beliefs. Importantly, participants characterized by this
motivational profile maintained low levels of implicit racial bias even under conditions of
cognitive business, thus suggesting that they are not necessarily better able to control their
prejudice responses, but they have less stronger associations between Blacks and negativity.

Cognitive Complexity
When individuals have the cognitive capacity to process information, they are more
likely to engage in controlled, individualized processing of information about outgroup
members. This propensity to process information depends, to some extent, on individual
differences, which include NFC and PNS.
Need for cognition is individuals’ tendency to engage in and enjoy thinking (Cacioppo
& Petty, 1982). Cacioppo and Petty tested the reliability and validity of a 45-item scale to
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measure NFC, which was later adjusted by Cacioppo, Petty, and Kao (1984) into a short version
consisting of 18 items. Individuals high in NFC typically show greater cognitive complexity, as
they are more likely to seek and enjoy tasks that are cognitively challenging. Relatedly, these
individuals are also less likely to rely on heuristics and simple cognitive structures such as
schemas when processing social information. Thus, NFC is significantly related to stereotyping,
consistent with several dual processing models which maintain that cognitive complexity is a
key variable that moderates the extent to which a mental process is automatic or controlled. For
example, Bargh (1994) proposed that individuals high in NFC are more likely to control their
mental processes, and thus show less automatic processing. Similarly, Fiske et al. (1999)
proposed in the continuum model that people are more likely to situate themselves at the
individuating end of the processing continuum when they are high in NFC. The hypothesis that
individuals low in NFC are more likely to use stereotypes was supported by several studies
(Crawford & Skowronski, 1998), which found that individuals low in NFC remembered more
stereotype-consistent information compared to those high in NFC.
A second important concept is that of personal need for structure. Neuberg and Newsom
(1993) proposed that “people meaningfully differ in the extent to which they are dispositionally
motivated to cognitively structure their worlds in simple, unambiguous ways” (p. 114), as way
to reduce cognitive overload. Thus, they conceptualized “need for structure” as the dispositional
need to simplify and structure one’s environment in simple ways. To measure individuals’
tendency to prefer and use simple cognitive structures, Neuberg and Newsom developed the
Personal Need for Structure (PNS) scale, which has been shown to possess sufficient reliability
(Cronbach α = .77) and convergent and discriminant validity. The tendency to structure the
social world is related to the use of cognitive structures such as schemas, as a way to reduce the

39
complexity of one’s environment. It follows that high need for structure should be associated
with greater stereotyping of others. Theoretically, this proposition is supported by dual process
models of automatic and controlled processing. For example, Fiske and her colleagues (1999)
proposed that individuals who are high in need for structure are more likely to categorize others
as group members compared to their low in need for structure counterparts. This hypothesis was
supported by Neuberg and Newsom who found that individuals high in need for structure
showed greater gender stereotyping, such that they were more likely to attribute negative
stereotypic traits to female compared to male targets.
Importantly, although past research has investigated how NFC and PNS relate to
implicit bias and stereotyping, so far no studies have successfully documented how these
personality variables moderate participants’ reactions to trainings designed to reduce prejudice
and stereotyping.

The Present Research
In the current studies I focused on the effectiveness of an implicit bias reduction
technique, Situational Attribution Training (Stewart et el., 2010). In short, this training
technique focused on undoing the fundamental attribution error (Pettigrew, 1979), the tendency
to attribute negative behaviors of outgroup members to dispositional factors while
underestimating the role of situational factors. The fundamental attribution error is one of the
pillars on which stereotyping stands, because attributing negative behaviors of outgroup
members to stable, internal traits tends to strengthen negative outgroup stereotypes. The
Situational Attribution Training technique was designed to circumvent this attributional
tendency by teaching White participants to attribute negative stereotypic behaviors of Black
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men to situational causes. Initial findings showed that participants trained in making situational
attributions were less likely to show automatic activation of negative Black stereotypes
compared to control participants.
The goal of the current two studies was to develop a model of Situational Attribution
Training, by investigating the social-cognitive mechanisms through which training leads to
decreased stereotype activation. I designed the current research to answer three main questions.
First, I was interested in the effects of training on situational inferences; second, I investigated
the cognitive costs of training; last, I was interested in the role of individual differences in
stereotype reduction following training. Taken together, the two current studies were designed
to investigate how Situational Attribution Training succeeds in reducing automatic stereotyping
and for whom it is most effective.

Study 1
First, what is Situational Attribution Training changing? Previous research showed that
it reduces the association between Blacks and negative stereotypic traits; however, little is
known about the effects of training on the tendency to make situational inferences of negative
behaviors performed by Blacks, which may explain the effects of training on reduced stereotype
activation.
To address this issue, I turned to the spontaneous inference literature. Spontaneous
inference theories look at how people infer the causes of other’s behaviors without awareness,
intention, and expenditure of many cognitive resources. It is generally agreed upon that people
spontaneously make trait inferences (STIs) about others’ behaviors (Lupfer et al., 1995; Stewart
et al., 2003; Uleman et al., 1996a), especially for stereotype-consistent behaviors (Wigboldus et
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al., 2004). The most common way to study STIs is the probe recognition task (McKoon &
Ratcliff, 1986). Construed as a memory task, this paradigm involves presenting people with
several behavioral sentences (e.g., “Larry lost his job.”). Following the presentation of each
sentence, participants are presented with probe words and decide as quickly and accurately as
possible whether the word appeared in the sentence or not. Of interest is the trait probe – a
negative trait that was implied but not present in the behavioral sentence (e.g., “incompetent”).
Participants who spontaneously activated this trait while reading the sentence had more
difficulty rejecting this probe, as suggested by both accuracy data – being more likely to
incorrectly identify that a trait appeared in the sentence (Lupfer et al., 1995; Stewart et al, 2003;
Uleman et al, 1996a) and reaction time data– being slower to correctly reject a trait (Uleman et
al, 1996a, Wigboldus et al., 2004).
In a more recent study, Ham and Vonk (2003) adapted the probe recognition task to
investigate the extent to which people also make situational inferences of others’ behaviors.
Instead of being presented with trait probes following a behavioral sentence, participants
quickly decided whether a situational probe had appeared in the sentence (e.g., “downsizing”
for “Larry lost his job”). In one study, Ham and Vonk found that participants were slower to
reject both trait and situational probes compared to control probes, suggesting automatic
activation of trait and situational inferences.
In the first study, I used Ham and Vonk’s (2003) adaptation of the probe recognition
task to investigate how participants’ SSIs are affected by Situational Attribution Training.
Previous findings using this training technique showed that participants are less likely to
associate Black faces with negative stereotypic traits. The current study allowed us to
understand whether this trait effect was accounted for by an increased tendency to infer
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situational causes of behavior spontaneously. Following Situational Attribution Training,
participants completed an adaptation of the probe recognition task designed to measure the
extent to which participants make SSIs after being exposed to negative, stereotypic behaviors
presumably performed by Black men. If Situational Attribution Training increases the tendency
to attribute negative stereotypic behaviors to situational factors, participants should be slower to
reject the situational versus control probes after completing Situational Attribution Training, but
not control training. These effects may also be visible for accuracy data, as participants may be
more likely to incorrectly decide that a situational probe appeared in the sentence compared to a
control probe after Situational Attribution Training, but not control training.

Study 2
How automatic are the effects of Situational Attribution Training? Compared to
controls, trained participants in Stewart et al. (2010) were less likely to associate negative Black
stereotypic traits with photos of Black men. Was this result obtained because training succeeded
in having participants automatically take into consideration previously underestimated
situational variables? In order to answer this question, I revisited the theory behind how people
make attributions of others’ behaviors. Gilbert and Malone (1995) proposed that people tend to
make dispositional inferences about others’ behaviors automatically, especially when they are
trying to understand people and not situations (Krull & Erikson, 1995). Later, they may
consciously attempt to correct these dispositional attributions in order to take into account the
situation, but only if they have sufficient cognitive resources to do so. I hypothesize that
Situational Attribution Training is automatizing the tendency to correct for the initial tendency
to make trait inferences, thus weakening the association between Blacks and negative
stereotypic traits. If these hypothesized corrections are indeed becoming automatic, I expect the
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stereotyping reduction effects of Situational Attribution Training to be maintained in conditions
involving both high and low cognitive resources.
As commonly seen in the literature, I limited participants’ cognitive resources while
performing the dependent task, by having them engage in a competing cognitive task. This
competing task should not disrupt performance on the primary task if the process of correcting
for trait inferences is automatic. However, no process is purely automatic or controlled; instead
automaticity lies on a continuum (Bargh, 1994). Thus, it is possible that training does not make
the corrections fully automatic; instead, training may increase the degree to which these
corrections are automatic. In Study 2, following training, half of the participants completed the
measure of automatic stereotype activation under conditions of cognitive load and the other half
under conditions of no cognitive load.
Unlike previous studies that investigated the stereotyping reduction effects of Situational
Attribution Training (Stewart et al., 2010), in the current study I used the probe recognition task
as a measure of automatic stereotype activation. This task was preferred because it allows for
the investigation of the effects of cognitive business on implicit bias. Unlike the person
categorization task, which was used in Stewart et al., the probe recognition task has been used
successfully in the past in conjunction with cognitive load tasks (Stewart et al., 2003;
Wigboldus et al., 2003). At the same time, using the probe recognition task was an opportunity
to replicate the stereotyping reduction effects of training with a different paradigm.
Although the person categorization task and other similar sequential priming tasks are
primarily used to measure implicit bias, it should be noted that the probe recognition task is also
used sometimes. All these tasks use response times to measure implicit bias. In sequential
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priming tasks, faster reaction times to stereotype consistent pairings (e.g., Black photo and
negative trait) compared to inconsistent ones suggest automatic stereotype activation. In the
probe recognition task, slower reaction times to rejecting trait probes compared to control
probes for negative stereotypic behaviors suggest automatic activation of negative trait
inferences. Thus, compared to sequential priming tasks, the probe recognition task is a more
indirect measure of automatic stereotype activation – it primarily measures the extent to which
participants make automatic trait inferences for negative stereotypic behaviors.
In the current study, participants in the control condition were expected to show
automatic activation of negative stereotypic trait inferences, such that they would be slower to
reject the trait versus the control probes for negative Black stereotypic behaviors. However, if
the effects of Situational Attribution Training replicate in the probe recognition task paradigm,
participants who complete Situational Attribution Training should not show spontaneous
activation of negative Black-stereotypic traits, such that they would not be slower to reject the
trait versus the control probes for negative Black stereotypic behaviors. In addition, if
participants’ tendency to make situational inferences has become automatic after training, there
should be a decrease in stereotype activation regardless of whether they are cognitively loaded
or not.
Last, who is most likely to benefit from training? Despite an abundance of studies that
investigated the effectiveness of implicit bias reduction techniques, there are very few studies
that investigated the moderating effects of individual differences on prejudice reduction (for a
review, see Levy, 1999). Another goal of Study 2 was to investigate individual differences as
moderators of the effects of training on automatic stereotype reduction. These individual
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differences included explicit prejudice, motivations to control prejudice, and cognitive
complexity (NFC and PNS) and were assessed before the training phase through several scales.
Are participants high in explicit prejudice less likely to respond positively to
stereotyping reduction interventions? Surprisingly few studies have investigated this question.
For example, Monteith (1993) induced participants to believe they discriminated against a gay
law school applicant based on his sexual orientation. Participants who were initially low in
prejudice showed more negative emotional reactions to this dissonance and less prejudice on a
subsequent task compared to participants who were initially high in prejudice. Similarly, I
propose that low-prejudice individuals would show more pronounced stereotype reduction
effects after undergoing Situational Attribution Training. In other words, training would work
best for participants who were initially low in explicit prejudice. This finding would also be
consistent with findings that show that low-prejudice individuals are less likely to engage in the
ultimate attribution error (Greenberg & Rosenfield, 1979; Wittenbrink et al., 1997). Thus, these
participants would also show more automatic stereotype reduction after a training aimed at
reducing this biased attributional pattern.
A second individual difference variable that may influence reactions to stereotyping
reduction interventions is motivation to control prejudice, as suggested by previous research.
For example, Allen, Sherman, and Klauer (2010) found reduced implicit bias when a Black
target was presented in a positive (church) context compared to a negative (prison) context, and
this effect was moderated by motivation to control prejudice (Dunton and Fazio, 1997).
Specifically, motivation did not matter when the target was presented in a negative context,
such that implicit bias was high at all levels of motivation. However, when the target was
presented in a church context, higher motivation was associated with less bias. In the current
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study, I investigated the role of internal and external motivations to control prejudice (IMS,
EMS, Plant and Devine, 1998) in moderating responses to Situational Attribution Training.
Internal motivation describes individuals’ tendency to control their biased responses because it
is personally important for them to foster non-prejudiced beliefs. External motivation stems
from individuals’ desire to conform to social norms that sanction the expression of prejudiced
beliefs. Previous research (Devine et al., 2002) found that individuals who are at the same time
high in IMS and low in EMS show the least amount of implicit racial bias. These findings were
replicated for implicit gender stereotyping by Latu and colleagues (in press). In the current
studies I propose that high IMS/low EMS individuals would also show the largest amount of
stereotype reduction following Situational Attribution Training. Individuals who are high in
IMS are intrinsically motivated to reduce stereotyping, and would thus be more likely to
internalize the stereotype reduction strategy of considering situational factors in explaining
Blacks’ negative behaviors. Low EMS individuals were also expected to show significant
implicit bias reduction. Although high EMS participants may be likely to respond to
experimental cues that promote anti-bias norms, it is unlikely that this motivation would play a
role in stereotype reduction following training, because such external sources of motivation may
not affect automatic responses.
Individual differences in cognitive complexity, such as need for cognition – the
tendency to engage in and enjoy thinking (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) and personal need for
structure – the tendency to prefer simple cognitive structures (Newberg & Newsom, 1993) may
also moderate the effects of Situational Attribution Training on automatic stereotype reduction.
Despite the theoretical and applied importance of this hypothesis, very few studies have
successfully documented the moderating role of NFC or PNS on participants’ reactions to bias
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reduction techniques. For example, Schaller et al. (1996) found that PNS did not moderate the
effects of a prejudice reduction technique on participants’ stereotyping of minimal groups. A
different, but related concept of preference for consistency (Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995)
received some attention in prejudice reduction research. Preference for consistency refers to the
individual tendency to be and appear consistent with one’s own responses and the desire that
others be consistent. Heitland and Bohner (2009) found that individuals high in need for
consistency showed less prejudice following a prejudice reduction intervention compared to
their low need in consistency counterparts. In the current research I investigated the role of
participants’ initial level of cognitive complexity in their reaction to Situational Attribution
Training. This training technique aimed at teaching participants to automatically take into
account complex factors that may determine negative behaviors performed by Black men. Thus,
individuals who are naturally inclined to prefer cognitive challenges may be likely to complete
correctly and benefit from training. I propose that high cognitive complexity would be
associated with more automatic stereotype reduction following Situational Attribution Training.
Specifically, individuals high in NFC and those low in need for structure would benefit most
from Situational Attribution Training. However, these individuals may only be able to process
and internalize the additional situational information (thus correcting for the trait inferences) if
they have sufficient cognitive resources to do so. Thus, the positive effects of training for
participants high in cognitive complexity may only be visible under conditions of low, but not
high cognitive load.

Hypotheses Overview
Hypothesis 1. In Study 1, Situational Attribution Training would increase the tendency
to make spontaneous situational inferences for negative stereotypic behaviors performed by
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African American men. Statistically, participants would be slower to reject situational compared
to control probes after completing Situational Attribution Training. This effect would be
inexistent or less strong for participants in the control condition.
The overarching goal of Study 2 was to investigate the effects of Situational Attribution
Training on automatic stereotype activation. In the probe recognition task, which was used as a
dependent measure, automatic stereotype activation is equivalent to the activation of STIs for
negative stereotypic traits. To show STI activation, participants should be slower to reject the
trait compared to the control probes after being exposed to negative Black stereotypic
behaviors. A stereotyping score was obtained by subtracting the average response time to
control probes from the average response time to trait probes, such that positive stereotyping
scores suggest automatic stereotype activation, and negative stereotyping scores suggest a lack
of automatic stereotype activation. The dependent variable used in all analyses was this
stereotyping score.
Hypothesis 2. Participants who complete Situational Attribution Training would show
reduced stereotype activation, as suggested by decreased STI activation for negative stereotypic
traits. There would be a significant effect of training condition on the stereotyping score, such
that training participants’ stereotyping scores would be significantly lower than those of control
participants.
Hypothesis 3. If the effects of Situational Attribution Training have become automatic,
participants would show reduced automatic stereotype activation regardless of whether they
were cognitively loaded or not when completing the probe recognition task. Statistically, there
would be a significant effect of training condition on stereotyping scores and this effect would
not be qualified by a significant interaction between training and load condition, such that
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stereotyping scores would be lower for training compared to control participants regardless of
load condition.
Hypothesis 4. Individual differences such as explicit prejudice, motivations to control
prejudice, NFC and PNS would moderate the effects of training on automatic stereotype
activation.
Hypothesis 4a. Individuals who were initially low in explicit prejudice would show the
most benefits from Situational Attribution Training. There would be a significant interaction
between explicit prejudice and training condition, such that the relationship between prejudice
and stereotyping would be significantly more positive in the training, but not in the control
condition.
Hypothesis 4b. Participants high in IMS and low in EMS would show the most
automatic stereotype reduction after Situational Attribution Training. I expected a significant
interaction between IMS, EMS, and training condition. For participants who completed training,
there would be a significant interaction between IMS and EMS, such that higher IMS would be
associated with less stereotyping at low levels of EMS, but not at high levels of EMS. This
interaction between IMS and EMS would not be significant for control participants.
Hypothesis 4c. Stereotype activation would decrease after Situational Attribution
Training, and these effects would be especially large for high NFC individuals. Also, I expected
this effect to occur only under no load, but not under load conditions. Statistically, I expected a
significant interaction between training condition, load condition and NFC. The relation
between NFC and stereotyping would be significantly more negative for individuals in the no
cognitive load-training condition, relative to the no cognitive load-control condition. No such
effects should be seen in all conditions in which there is load.
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Hypothesis 4d. I expected a significant interaction between training condition, load
condition, and PNS. The relation between PNS and stereotyping would be significantly more
positive for no load-training individuals compared to no load–control individuals. There would
be no such effects in the load conditions.

CHAPTER 2: METHOD
Two experiments were conducted to investigate the mechanisms and moderators of
Situational Attribution Training. In Study 1, I investigated the effects of training on spontaneous
situational inferences. Study 2 was more extensive and investigated the effect of training on
spontaneous trait inferences, the extent to which the effects of training have become automatic,
and whether individual differences such as explicit prejudice, motivations to reduce prejudice,
and cognitive complexity moderate responses to training.

Study 1

Participants and Design
Eighty-one non-African American students (67 White, 11 Asian American, 1 Latino/a, 1
other) enrolled in Introductory Psychology courses participated in the experiment, as one means
to fulfill a course requirement. Twenty-four participants were male and 72 were native English
speakers. Participants were randomly assigned to either the Situational Attribution Training or
the Grammar Control condition. Afterwards, all participants completed an adaptation of the
probe recognition task, designed to measure the degree of activation of spontaneous situational
inferences.
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Procedure and Materials
Phase 1: Situational Attribution Training. Upon coming into the lab, participants
were randomly assigned to either the Situational Attribution Training condition or to the
Grammar Control condition. In the Situational Attribution Training condition participants were
informed that they would be taking part in a study that investigated how people explain others’
behaviors. The experimenter explained and exemplified the difference between dispositional
and situational explanations and informed participants that they were randomly assigned to a
condition in which they would make situational attributions of others’ behaviors. These
instructions were repeated once participants started the computer self-paced program. The
program instructions also informed them that they were randomly assigned to a condition in
which they would have to make judgments for negative behaviors performed by Black people.
After the instructions and six practice trials with feedback, participants began the
training phase, which consisted of 480 trials divided into six blocks of 80 trials. Appendix A
contains an example of a typical trial in this condition. For each trial, the photograph of a Black
young male was presented on the top of the screen, accompanied by the label “African
American” to the left of the photograph, to insure that participants categorized the person by
race. Underneath the photograph, participants saw a behavior that was strongly suggestive of a
negative stereotypic trait as indicated by a pretest (loud, criminal, unintelligent, unreliable,
irresponsible violent, dishonest, dangerous, lazy, promiscuous). After a 3,000ms exposure time
to the photo and behavior, a situational and a dispositional explanation appeared on the left and
right bottom of the screen. For example, the behavior “Arrived at work an hour late” was
accompanied by a situational explanation (“The power went out and reset his alarm”) and a
dispositional explanation (“He is a particularly irresponsible person”). The participants’ task
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was to choose the situational explanation of the two, by pressing one of two designated keys on
the keyboard. For half of the trials the situational explanation appeared on the left side of the
screen, and for the other half on the right side of the screen.
Participants randomly assigned to the Grammar Control condition also completed 480
trials in which they were exposed to the same photographs and stereotypic African American
behaviors as participants in the experimental condition. However, instead of making situational
attributions for those behaviors, they were asked to count the number of nouns (240 trials) and
verbs (240 trials) in the behavioral sentences and make two-choice decisions using the keyboard
(for example, they had to choose between “2 or under 2 nouns” and ”over 2 nouns”). Appendix
A contains an example of a typical trial in this condition.
Phase 3: Measure of situational inference activation. Following the training phase, all
participants completed an adaptation of the probe recognition task, designed to measure
spontaneous situational inference activation (Ham & Vonk, 2003).
Probe recognition task pretest. The goal of the pretest for this study was
twofold: to generate behavioral sentences that allow for a relatively high level of activation of
situational inferences, while also allowing for the activation of negative African American
stereotypic traits not seen in training: agitated, bitter, uneducated, ignorant, impractical, poor,
suspicious, superstitious. Eight research assistants generated several behaviors that reflected
each of these traits. Of those behaviors, I chose the most appropriate ones to be pretested in
terms of trait activation. Twenty-two undergraduate students participated in the pretest, as one
means to fulfill a course requirement. They were presented with a total of 79 behavioral
sentences and instructed to write down one-word inferences about the situation in which each

53
behavior occurred. After aggregating their responses, I selected 20 sentences that allowed for
the strongest levels of activation of situational inferences. At the same time, attention was given
that these sentences also allowed for a relatively high level of activation of negative African
American trait inferences, as suggested by data from 18 participants who wrote down one-word
trait inferences for each behavior. Table 2 presents the list of the chosen behaviors, situations
and traits, and percentage of participants that generated each situation and trait (or close
synonyms) after reading the sentence.
Table 2. Behaviors Used in the Probe Recognition Task (Study 1), Associated Situations and
Traits, and Percentage of Pretest Participants Who Generated Each Situation (N = 22) and Trait
(N = 18)
Behavior

Situation

Pretest

Trait

Percentage
Guards his bag when anyone passes him

Pretest
Percentage

Robber

25%

Suspicious

41.18%

Crime

25%

Suspicious

52.94%

Can not find a good job

Recession

25%

Uneducated

Is not familiar with American history

Immigrant

50%

Uneducated

23.53%

Worked as a janitor, as he could not get

Economy

15%

Uneducated

11.76%

Fashion

30%

Poor

25.53%

Did not have cash in his wallet at lunch

Credit

20%

Poor

29.41%

Walks to the supermarket for grocery

Close

25%

Poor

on the street
Installed a security camera in his front
yard

hired anywhere else*
Wears tattered old jeans most of the time

shopping
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Does not own a car, instead he rides

City

20%

Poor

17.65%

Stuck

40%

Impractical

17.65%

public transportation*
Could not unlock the door although he
had the right key
Took the long way home from his

(Dumb)
Traffic

10%

Impractical

Broken

42.4%

Impractical

45.7%

Unclear

20%

Ignorant

35.29%

sister’s house
Could not get the computer started in his
office
Does not understand an important
document

(Dumb)

Got an F on his final exam

Hard

45%

Ignorant

52.94%
(Lazy)

Did not know who the vice-presidential

Foreign

10%

Ignorant

29.41%

Falsely recited current law to a friend*

Changed

20%

Ignorant

23.53%

Didn’t know how to start a lawnmower

New

20%

Ignorant

11.76%

Was pacing through his parents' living

Searching

15%

Agitated

47.06%

Fire

25%

Bitter

23.53%

candidates were for the current election*

room*
Threw a glass of water on Bill

(Rude)
Declined to get coffee with an old
accomplished classmate.

Time

10%

Bitter

35.29%
(Jealous)

* Behavior also used in Study 2
Probe recognition task. The task was modeled after Ham and Vonk (2003;
Study 1) who adapted the probe recognition paradigm to measure the activation of spontaneous
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situational inferences. Participants were told that they would complete a memory task, unrelated
to the previous training task. After six practice trials, participants completed 120 trials in which
they were presented, one at a time, with 20 behaviors that were suggestive of negative
stereotypic African American traits not seen in training (suspicious, uneducated, poor,
impractical, ignorant, agitated, bitter; see Table 2 for behaviors, situational probes and
underlying traits). Each behavioral sentence appeared six times followed by one different probe
type each time. The behavior/probe combinations appeared in random order on the screen. Two
of the probe types were of interest to the current analyses. First, the experimental probes were
situational probes that did not appear in the sentences but that were presumably spontaneously
activated by the sentences, according to the pretest. Second, the control probes were situational
probes that did not appear in the sentence and were not spontaneously activated by the
sentences. Consistent with Ham and Vonk, these probes were situational probes activated by a
different behavior in the task; however, they were rearranged to follow a behavior that did not
imply them. The correct answer for both experimental and control probes was NO.
I also included four filler probes for each sentence. First, there were two probes that
were actually seen in the sentence. The correct answer for these probes was YES. These probes
were included so that participants would not learn that a successful responding strategy is to
answer NO on every trial. Additionally, in order to keep participants focused on the meaning of
the sentences, I included two additional filler probes that were verbs that were seen and not seen
in the sentences. Table 3 contains an example of a behavior and associated probes
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Table 3. Example of a behavior and associated probes used in Study 1
Probe

Correct Answer

Probe Type
Got an F on his final exam.

Situational

No

Situation not seen but implied: “Hard”

Control

No

Situation not seen or implied: “Broken”

Filler 1

Yes

Property seen: “Final”

Filler 2

Yes

Property seen: “Exam”

Filler 3

Yes

Verb seen: “Got”

Filler 4

No

Verb not seen: “Invited”

Each trial started with a 1,000 ms exposure to a row of five X’s in the middle of the
screen, in order to focus participants’ gaze. The fixation point was then replaced with a photo of
a Black man not seen in training, paired with a behavioral sentence; both remained on the screen
for 3,000 ms. A blank screen then appeared for 500ms, which was followed by the presentation
of a probe in the middle of the screen. The YES and NO response options were displayed on the
bottom of the screen. The probe remained on the screen until participants made a decision about
whether the probe had appeared in the sentence or not, using the appropriate keys on the
keyboard. After a response, a new trial began with a row of X’s. Participants’ responses were
recorded in milliseconds.
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Results
Preliminary analyses. I eliminated data from five participants for whom there were
computer problems that interfered with the tasks. This resulted in a working N of 76
participants.
Response time data were prepared in accordance with Ham and Vonk (2003; Study 1).
First, only correct responses were considered in the final analyses of response time data.
Second, outliers below 200 ms and above 2,000 ms were dropped. Finally, response times were
log-transformed to avoid a skewed distribution of response times. Two variables were obtained:
the mean response time to situational probes (words that were not present but implied by the
sentence) and the mean response time to control probes (words that were not present or implied
by the sentence). Results are reported in milliseconds from the untransformed variables.
For accuracy data, I computed two variables: the total number of trials in which
participants correctly rejected the situational probes and the total number of trials in which
participants correctly rejected the control probes. As did Ham and Vonk (2003), I used a square
root transformation to avoid skewed data. However, the pattern of findings did not differ
between the transformed and untransformed analyses, so untransformed data are reported.
Main analyses.
Response times. I conducted a mixed-design 2 (Condition: Situational
Attribution Training versus Grammar Control) X 2 (Probe: Situational versus Control)
ANOVA, with the second factor as a repeated measure on the response times to situational and
control probes. There was no main effect of condition, F(1, 74) = .23, p =.64, η2 = .003, such
that participants in the training and control conditions responded equally quickly. This analysis

58
revealed a significant main effect of probe, F(1, 74) = 32.31, p < .001, η2 = .30, such that
participants were significantly slower to reject the situational probes (M = 958.88) compared to
the control probes (M = 932.03). Contrary to our hypothesis, this difference was not qualified
by an interaction with the training condition, F(1, 74) = .81, p = .37, η2 = 01. Participants were
slower to reject the situational probes compared to the control probes both after completing
Situational Attribution Training, F(1, 42) = 12.97, p < .01 (M = 988.62, SD = 412.04 and M =
945.11, SD = 315.63, respectively), and after completing the Grammar Control condition, F(1,
32) = 9.56, p < .001, η2 = .38 (M= 952.92, SD = 225.05 and M = 880.04, SD = 215.34,
respectively). In other words, both training and control participants spontaneously activated
situational inferences for negative stereotypic African American behaviors.
Accuracy data. I conducted a mixed-design 2 (Condition: Situational Attribution
Training versus Grammar Control) X 2 (Probe: Situational versus Control) ANOVA on
accuracy data, with the second factor as a repeated measure. This analysis revealed no
significant main effects or interactions, all Fs < 1. Thus, I was not able to observe evidence of
SSI activation in terms of accuracy in either the Situational Attribution Training condition, F(1,
42) = 0, p = 1, η2 = .00 (M = 19.84 and M = 19.84, respectively) or the Grammar Control
condition, F(1, 32) = 1.85, p = .18, η2 = .05 (M = 19.85 and M = 19.94, respectively).

Discussion
Study 1 findings did not support my first hypothesis that Situational Attribution Training
would increase the tendency to make SSIs. In the present experiment, training had no effect on
SSIs above and beyond that of controls. Response time analyses revealed that participants who
completed Situational Attribution Training spontaneously activated situational inferences, as
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evidenced by quicker response times to rejecting the situational compared to the control probe.
However, this tendency was also observed for participants in the control condition. Both effects
were of medium sizes, suggesting similar levels of SSI activation for both training and control
participants.
There are several theoretical and methodological implications of the null findings in the
current study. This discussion will include an analysis of these issues, as well as suggested
future directions for the investigation of situational inferences following Situational Attribution
Training.
Given that SSIs did not differ between training and control participants, it may be
fruitful to have a repeated-measures design, in which SSIs are assessed before and after
participants complete Situational Attribution Training. This way it would be possible to assess
whether SSIs have increased following training and not relative to control participants whose
SSIs may have been activated during the completion of Grammar Control condition. Similar to
the Situational Attribution Training condition, participants in the Grammar Control condition
were also exposed to negative stereotypic behaviors performed by Black men. As suggested by
findings from Ham and Vonk (2006) exposure to behavioral statements can determine the
automatic activation of SSIs. An alternative option for future research would be to compare the
SSI activation of training participants to that of control participants who only complete the
dependent measure of inference activation without receiving any type of training. This would
enable us to investigate the relative activation of SSIs for training compared to “pure” control
participants.
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Second, I was not able to see any training effects on accuracy rates, suggesting, once
more, that training had no effect on SSIs. Some methodological issues may also be raised. In the
current studies accuracy reached a ceiling effect (error rates below 1%), consistent with probe
recognition task studies (Uleman et al., 1996a; Wigboldus et al.. 2003) that did not find
significant effects on error rates. One exception comes from Stewart et al. (2003) who found
significant effects on accuracy rates using a more challenging task in which participants were
tested for their memory of three behavioral sentences in each trial. However, the current task
may not be challenging enough for participants to make a significant number of errors. One
solution to increase error rates would be to restrict the window of responding to the probe
recognition task. This change would force participants to respond more quickly and possibly
increase the chance of incorrectly identifying a trait that did not appear in the sentence.
Third, from a theoretical point of view, it may be that Situational Attribution Training
does not have an effect on spontaneous situational inferences but only on intentional inferences.
This explanation brings back the distinction between spontaneous inference research which
studies automatic inferences (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Krull & Erikson, 1995) and social
inference research which studies intentional inferences (see Uleman et al., 1996b for a review).
In the intentional social inference literature, Gilbert and Malone as well as Krull and Erikson
proposed that people initially draw trait inferences when they are interested in understanding
people, which is the case most of the time in our daily lives. Their models predict that when
people have this goal in mind, they efficiently make trait inferences, which may be corrected
later to take into account situational factors. However, Krull and Erikson also propose that
people initially draw situational inferences when they are interested in understanding situations.
Thus, the extent to which individuals make intentional trait or situational inferences depends
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largely on their processing goals. This may not the case for spontaneous inferences such as STIs
and SSIs, which are activated automatically, regardless of the perceiver’s processing goals.
Based on this theoretical account, Ham and Vonk (1996) argued that individuals might
activate both STIs and SSIs regardless of whether they want to understand the person or the
situation. This proposition was supported by their 1996 findings, which showed that participants
activated both STIs and SSIs for the same behaviors. Despite numerous findings that suggest
that individuals underestimate situational explanations when making intentional inferences (see
an overview of the correspondence bias research, Gilbert & Malone, 1995), participants in Ham
and Vonk’s studies showed SSI activation without any intervention that would stimulate this
inference strategy. Consistent with these findings, control participants in the current study also
showed reliable evidence of SSI activation in the absence of training. However, whereas
training may not have a strong effect on SSIs, it may be possible that it has a significant effect
on intentional situational inferences – situational attributions people make when they have an
impression formation goal in mind. Specifically, it may be that by training participants to
consider situational factors during Situational Attribution Training, we are changing
participants’ inference goals, such that they are more invested in understanding situations rather
than traits. As a result, consistent with Krull and Erikson’s model, they may strengthen their
intentional situational inferences, which would negatively affect their tendency to draw quick,
efficient trait inferences for negative stereotypic behaviors of Black men.
Finally, there was a great deal of variability in participants’ response time data after
completing Situational Attribution Training. This finding suggests that individual differences
are an important aspect which should be taken into account when investigating the effects of
training on implicit bias. I designed Study 2 to investigate this hypothesis.
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Study 2
Stewart and colleagues (2010) showed that Situational Attribution Training reduced the
degree of association between negative traits and Black photos. Using a different paradigm, in
the current study I sought to replicate these findings by showing that training reduces the
likelihood to make spontaneous trait inferences for negative stereotype-consistent behaviors
performed by Black men. In addition, in the current study I looked at whether the effects of
training have become automatic, such that the stereotyping reduction effects of training would
be maintained even under conditions of cognitive load. Finally, taking a novel approach for the
stereotype reduction literature, I investigated for whom training was most effective, by studying
the moderators of Situational Attribution Training. This investigation of individual differences
is made particularly important by the null findings of Study 1, and the suggestion that perhaps
training will be effective for some but not all participants.

Participants and Design
White American students (N = 129) enrolled in Introductory Psychology courses
participated in the first part of experiment, as one means to fulfill a course requirement. Of
those, 117 participants returned to the lab for the second part of the experiment, which took
place two to four days after the first part. In the first part of the experiment, all participants
completed several questionnaires on the computer. In the second part, participants returned to
the lab and were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: 2 Training groups (Situational
Attribution Training Condition versus Grammar Control Condition) X 2 Load for Probe
Recognition Task (High Load versus No Load).
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Procedure and Materials
Phase 1: Moderators. In the initial phase of the experiment, participants completed
several questionnaires that measured individual difference variables that were hypothesized to
moderate the effects of Situational Attribution Training on decreased automatic stereotype
activation. These measures included explicit prejudice, motivations to control prejudice, NFC,
and PNS. Appendix B contains all the scales and instructions used in this study.
The Social Distance Scale (SDS, adapted from Bogardus, 1925) has been successfully
used in the past to measure prejudice against Black people (Stewart et al., 2003). The scale
consists of several statements such as, “I would be willing to have a Black American person as
my roommate/friend/dance partner/governor/president, etc.” The SDS contains fourteen such
items, ranging from a very intimate relationship (e.g., spouse) to a more distant relationship
(e.g. president). Participants rated their agreement with each of the items on a 7-point scale (1 –
Strongly disagree to 7 – Strongly agree). Scores were added to obtain a final SDS score,
Cronbach α = .92, such that lower scores indicate more prejudice.
The Attitude Towards Blacks Scale (ATBS; Brigham, 1993) was also used as a measure
of prejudice. The ATBS is a 20-item scale and sample items include “I favor open housing laws
that allow more racial integration of neighborhoods” and “I get very upset when I hear a White
make a prejudiced remark about a Black person”. Participants rated their agreement with those
items on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). After
reversing the scores of appropriate items, responses were totaled to obtain a final ATBS score,
Cronbach α = .85, with higher scores indicating a more positive attitude toward Blacks.
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The Modern Racism Scale (MRS; McConahay, 1983), a 5-item self-report
questionnaire, was designed to measure the denial of current discrimination of Black people and
lack of support for Black people’s fight for equality (e.g., “Discrimination against Blacks is no
longer a problem in the United States,” “Blacks are too demanding in their push for equal
rights”). Responses were measured on scales from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
Scores were added to obtain an overall MRS score, Cronbach α = .78, with higher values
representing more modern racism.
The Internal / External Motivation to Control Prejudice Scale (IMS/EMS; Plant &
Devine, 1998) is a self-report questionnaire that contains two subscales. Five items measure
participants’ internal motivation to respond without racial prejudice (e.g., “Being nonprejudiced toward Black people is important to my self-concept.”). The other five items
measure participants’ external motivations to respond without racial prejudice (e.g., “I try to
hide any negative thoughts about Black people in order to avoid negative reactions from
others”). All items were measured on a 7-point scale, from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly
agree), and responses were added together to obtain an IMS total score, Cronbach α = .82 and
an EMS total score, Cronbach α = .87, with higher scores indicating higher levels of either
motivation.
The Need for Cognition Scale (NFC; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) measures
participants’ tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful thinking (e.g., “I would prefer complex
to simple problems,” “Thinking is not my idea of fun”). Participants were asked to rate their
agreement with 18 items on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). After
reversing the scores of the appropriate items, responses were added to obtain a final NFC score,
Cronbach α = .91, with higher scores reflecting higher NFC.
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The Personal Need for Structure Scale (PNS; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993) measures two
related concepts: the extent to which people desire to establish structure in their life (e.g., “I like
to have a place for everything and everything in its place”) and the manner in which people
respond to a lack of structure (e.g., “I don’t like situations that are uncertain”). Participants were
asked to state their agreement with each of 11 statements on a 7-point scale ranging from 1
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Scores were added to obtain a final PNS score,
Cronbach α = .84, with higher scores indicating higher need for structure.
In order to conceal the study’s goal of measuring racially biased attitudes, I also
included several filler items, which measured individual’s religiosity and their tendency to
ruminate. These scales were not analyzed for this study.
Phase 2: Situational Attribution Training. Two to four days after they completed the
questionnaires, participants returned to the lab to complete the second part of the study, which
was presented as being unrelated to the first part. The second phase of Study 2 was identical
with Phase 1 of Study 1, with participants being randomly assigned to either the Situational
Attribution Training or the Grammar Control condition.
Phase 3: Measure of stereotype activation. Following the training phase, all
participants completed the probe recognition task, as a measure of stereotypic trait inference
activation.
Probe recognition task pretest. The goal of the pretest was to generate
behavioral sentences that allow for a relatively high level of activation of negative African
American stereotypic traits not seen in training: agitated, bitter, uneducated, ignorant,
impractical, poor, suspicious, superstitious. The same 79 behavioral sentences generated by
eight research assistants based on the negative stereotypic traits were pretested on 18
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undergraduate students, who participated as a means to fulfill a course requirement. Participants
were instructed to write down one-word inferences about the trait of the person they read about.
Afterwards, I aggregated their answers and selected twelve sentences that allowed for the
strongest levels of activation of African-American trait inferences. Table 4 presents the list of
the chosen behaviors, traits, and percentage of participants that generated that trait (or close
synonyms) after reading the sentence.
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Table 4. Behaviors Used in the Probe Recognition Task (Study 2), Associated Traits, and
Percentage of Pretest Participants Who Generated Each Trait (N = 18)
Behavior

Trait

Pretest
Percentage

Was asked to name seven continents and he named seven countries

Uneducated

11.76%

Worked as a janitor, as he could not get hired anywhere else

Uneducated

11.76%

Could not pay for his lunch today

Poor

55.82%

Does not own a car, instead he rides public transportation

Poor

17.65

Was pacing through his parents' living room

Agitated

47.06%

Shakes his leg continuously while sitting at the table

Agitated

64.70%

Did not know who the vice-presidential candidates were for the

Ignorant

29.41%

Ignorant

23.53%

Bitter

17.65%

Resents the fact that his father remarried

Bitter

23.53%

Did not come to work on Friday the 13th

Superstitious

70.58%

Walks around the ladder on his way home

Superstitious

58.82%

current election
Falsely recited current law to a friend
Hasn't congratulated a coworker who received a promotion over
him

Probe recognition task. The task was modeled after Wigboldus et al. (2003;
Study 2), and it was introduced to participants as a memory task, unrelated to the previous task.
After two practice trials, participants were presented, one at a time, with 12 behaviors that were
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suggestive of negative stereotypic African American traits not seen in training (uneducated,
poor, agitated, ignorant, bitter, superstitious). Each behavior was presented twice, once paired
with a Black photo not seen in training, and once paired with a White photo. The presentation
order for all behaviors was randomized. The experimenter informed participants that their
memory would be tested after the presentation of each sentence. After a 1,200 ms exposure time
to the behavioral sentence and the photo, 5 one-word probes were presented one by one. The
participants’ task was to decide as quickly as possible whether the probe had literally appeared
in the sentence. There were two probes of interest: a trait probe that was not present, but that
was presumably activated while reading the sentence (e.g., “uneducated” for “Worked as a
janitor, as he could not get hired anywhere else”) and a control probe, which was a nonstereotypic trait that was not present or activated by reading the sentence (e.g., “deceptive”).
Other filler probes contained a verb that was not present in the sentence, a verb that was present
in the sentence, and an article or preposition that was present in half of the sentences and not
present in the rest. Thus, for half of the trials the correct answer was “yes,” and for the other
half the correct answer was “no.” The order of the probes for each sentence was fully
randomized. Table 5 presents an example of a behavior and associated probes.
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Table 5. Example of a behavior and associated probes used in Study 2
Probe

Correct Answer

Probe Type

Could not pay for his lunch today.
Trait

No

Stereotypic trait not seen but implied: “Poor”

Control

No

Nonstereotypic trait not seen or implied: “Nervous”

Filler 1

Yes

Verb seen: “Pay”

Filler 2

Yes

Property seen: “Lunch”

Filler 3

Yes

Preposition seen/not seen: “For”/”Of”

Load manipulation. The load manipulation was modeled after Wigboldus et al.
(2003) who successfully used it in conjunction with the probe recognition task1. Half of the
participants completed the probe recognition task under a no-load condition. The other half
completed the task under conditions of high cognitive load. Before each trial (behavior and five
probes), participants were presented with a five-digit number for 5,000ms. At the end of each
trial, they were asked to recall this number in writing. A new number was then presented before
the onset of the following trial. Presumably, participants were rehearsing the number while
performing the task, and were thus cognitively loaded.

Results
Preliminary analyses. Based on a priori criteria, such as low memory rates for load
task, experimenter or task error, I eliminated several participants from the initial data set. Data
from three participants who had extremely low memory rates for the load task (0%, 0%, and
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4.17% correct recall) were initially eliminated. Also, 26 additional participants were eliminated
due to experimenter error, falling asleep during the training phase, hitting the wrong keys and
not completing the training task completely, and computer problems during the task. After the
elimination, the final N was 88. Participants in the final sample had an age that ranged between
18 and 35 years, with a mean of 20 years. Two of the participants were non-native English
speakers. Thirty participants were men and 58 were women.
The probe recognition task data were prepared in accordance with Wigboldus et al.
(2004, Study 2), after which I modeled the task. Of interest were the response time data from
the trait and control probes, to which the correct answer was “no.” First, I eliminated all
incorrect “yes” responses. This resulted in the elimination of 1.59% of responses (67 out of
4224 total responses). Second, I systematically eliminated outliers, by replacing response times
greater than two standard deviations above the mean with the mean for that particular item.
Response times for relevant items were averaged to obtain two scores: the response time to trait
probes and to control probes after being presented with a negative behavior paired with a Black
photo. A difference score was also computed by subtracting the response time to the control
probes from the trait probes; this variable was named the stereotyping score. If participants
automatically activate negative stereotypes of Blacks, they should take longer to reject the
negative trait probe compared to control probe. Thus, higher stereotyping scores reflect more
stereotyping of African Americans, with negative stereotyping scores suggesting lower
automatic stereotyping.
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Main analyses.
Stereotype reduction as a function of training and cognitive load. I first
conducted a mixed-design ANOVA, with the type of probe (trait vs. control) and race of photo
(Black vs. White) as repeated factors, and training condition (Situational Attribution Training
vs. Grammar Control) and Cognitive Load (no load vs. high load) as between-subjects
variables. Results showed a main effect of load condition, F(1, 84) = 17.29, p < .001, η2 = .17,
such that loaded participants were significantly slower (M = 1003.45) compared to non-loaded
participants (M = 837.94), across all trials and training conditions. Results also revealed a main
effect of type of probe, F(1, 84) = 7.13, p = .009, η2 =.08, such that participants were
significantly slower to reject the trait probe (M = 933.85) compared to the control probe (M =
907.53), regardless of the race of the photograph paired with the behavior. This main effect was
qualified by an interaction trending towards significance between type of probe and cognitive
load condition, F(1, 297) = 3.28, p = .07, η2 = .04. Follow up analyses showed that loaded
participants were significantly slower to reject all trait probes (M = 1024.01) compared to all
control probes (M = 980.29), F(1, 41) = 7.59, p = .009, η2 = .16. However, this difference was
not significant for the no load participants, F(1, 45) = .53, p = .47, η2 = .01 (M = 842.17 and M
= 833.70 for the trait and control probes, respectively). These findings suggest that our load
manipulation was partially successful in cognitively loading participants. However, we
observed no stereotyping effects, with participants not being slower to reject the trait compared
to the control probe in either condition. In addition, there were no stereotyping reduction effects
of training condition. However, these effects may be moderated by several individual
differences variables, such as explicit prejudice, motivations to control prejudice, NFC, and
PNS.
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I initially investigated the role of individual differences in moderating the effects of
training on stereotype activation by computing correlations between the stereotyping score,
explicit prejudice, motivations to control prejudice, NFC, and PNS for each condition. Tables 6
and 7 display these correlations by training and load conditions. The relationship between all
individual differences, training, and load condition were also investigated using hierarchical
multiple regression analyses. Significant effects were only found for modern racism, NFC, and
IMS/EMS. I reported these analyses below.
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Table 6. Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Situational Attribution Training Participants who completed the probe
recognition task under No Cognitive Load (Above the Diagonal) and Cognitive Load (Below the Diagonal) Conditions in Study 2, N
= 47

Variables

Non Loaded
Participants

Loaded
Participants

(N = 23)

(N = 24)

Intercorrelations

M

SD

M

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1. Stereotyping Score

19.61

101.57

79.51

170.86

-

-.22

-.11

.42*

.36†

.23

-.39†

.30

2. Social Distance

89.00

14.67

91.92

8.19

.07

-

.81*

-.47*

.42*

-.34

.34

-.32

3. Attitude Towards Blacks

109.00

17.94

114.42

14.11

.06

.60*

-

-.69*

.56*

-.23

.42*

-.10

4. Modern Racism

11.74

4.98

10.21

5.00

.18

-.34

-.77*

-

-.27

.15

-.45*

-.03

5. IMS

28.26

7.11

29.75

4.81

.10

.28

.63*

-.54*

-

.25

-.08

-.14

6. EMS

21.74

8.15

18.42

7.90

-.06

-.41*

-.33

.49*

-.17

-

-.50*

.24

7. Need for Cognition

82.17

20.15

78.96

18.03

.03

.15

.34

-.28

.18

.03

-

-.35

8. Personal Need for Structure

42.52

12.49

41.04

9.81

.01

-.24

-.34

.16

-.08

-.01

-.46*

-

†p<.10, *p<.05
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Table 7. Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Grammar Control Participants who completed the probe recognition
task under No Cognitive Load (Above the Diagonal) and Cognitive Load (Below the Diagonal) Conditions in Study 2, N = 41

Variables

Non Loaded
Participants

Loaded
Participants

(N = 23)

(N = 18)

Intercorrelations

M

SD

M

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1. Stereotyping Score

38.32

89.24

33.75

125.74

-

.08

.09

-.28

.28

-.37†

.08

.15

2. Social Distance

91.52

90.00

9.00

.10

-

.72*

-.49*

.68*

-.09

.35

-.01

3. Attitude Towards Blacks

116.52

12.28

105.67

15.79

-.19

.76*

-

-.60*

.70*

-.29

.35

.01

4. Modern Racism

9.74

4.28

12.39

6.44

-.07

-.53*

-.72*

-

-.59*

.35

-.24

.04

5. IMS

29.65

5.66

28.17

5.77

.19

.34

.52*

-.27

-

-.37

.19

-.02

6. EMS

18.65

5.92

20.11

7.80

.38

.23

-.05

-.10

.26

-

-.06

-.04

7. Need for Cognition

91.48

13.90

82.83

15.63

-.36

.28

.28

-.02

.07

.31

-

.32

8. Personal Need for Structure

43.39

7.85

42.55

10.98

-.31

-.03

.08

-.03

.19

.07

.05

-

†p<.10, *p<.05

11.36
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Need for cognition and stereotype reduction. Because the dependent variable in
this analysis was a repeated measure variable – the response times to control probes and trait
probes - I used the Sum/Difference regression model (Judd, Kenny, & McClelland, 2001),
which allowed for the examination of interactions with the repeated-measure variable.
Consistent with the Sum/Difference regression model, I conducted two regression analyses with
two different dependent measures. In both models I conducted hierarchical multiple regression
analyses with NFC (mean centered), training condition (dummy coded: control = 0; training =
1), and load condition (dummy coded: no load = 0, load = 1) as predictors in the first step. In the
second step I added three two-way interaction terms between NFC, training condition and load
condition. A third step added the three-way interaction between NFC, training, and load
conditions. The two models differed however in the dependent variable used. In the betweensubjects model, the dependent variable was the sum between the response times to trait probes
and control probes. This model enabled me to examine the main effects and interactions of
NFC, training, and load on the overall reaction time to both trait and control probes. Table 8
presents standardized and unstandardized regression coefficients, as well as standard errors for
main effects and interaction terms in all three regression steps for the between-subjects model.
Analyses revealed a main effect of load condition, such that loaded participants were
significantly slower to respond to all probes (trait and control) compared to those who were not
loaded. No other main effects or interactions were significant.
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Table 8. Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for the Between-Subjects Model, with
Need for Cognition (NFC), Training Condition, and Load Condition Predicting the Sum
Between Response Times to Trait and Control Probes in Study 2 (N = 88)
Step 1
Variable

Step 2

B (SE B)

ß

-1.44 (2.63)

-.06

Training

-17.14 (90.98)

-.02

Load

299.25 (90.39)

.34* -369.88 (139.94)

NFC

B (SE B)

Step 3
ß

B (SE B)

ß

1.24 (5.32)

.05

-.23 (6.51)

-.01

46.31 (131.88)

.05

36.32 (134.97)

.04

.42* 360.26 (142.77)

.41*

NFC X Training

-2.74 (5.67)

-.09

-.58 (7.91)

-.02

NFC X Load

-1.63 (5.38)

-.04

1.34 (9.27)

.04

121.00 (189.46)

-.12

-116.65(190.77)

-.12

-4.50 (11.41)

.10

Training X Load
NFC X Training
X Load
*p < .05

Next, I investigated the within-subjects model, with the difference score between
response times to trait and control probes as a dependent variable. As a reminder, being slower
at responding to trait versus control probes in the probe recognition task denotes negative
stereotyping trait activation. Thus, higher difference scores between the response times to trait
versus control probes represent greater stereotyping of African Americans. Overall, participants
did not show evidence of implicit stereotyping, as there was not a significant difference in their
response time to trait versus control probes, as suggested by the statistics of the constant, b =
28.96, SE = 23.60, p = .22. Table 9 presents standardized and unstandardized regression
coefficients, as well as standard errors for main effects and interaction terms in all three
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regression steps for the within-subjects model. Findings from the third regression step showed
an interaction trending towards significance between NFC, training condition, and load
condition, with the addition of this three-way interaction in the third regression step adding
incremental variance that was approaching significance.2 To break down this three-way
interaction, I analyzed the simple slopes for the relationship between NFC and stereotyping for
each condition. Figure 1 is a visual representation of this interaction. For the Training/No Load
participants, the simple slope was negative, b = -1.95, SE = 1.33, p = .15, such that higher NFC
was associated with lower stereotyping after Situational Attribution Training. Control/No load
participants showed a different, less dramatic pattern, b = .50, SE = 1.93, p = .80, as did
Training/Load participants, b = .33, SE = 1.46, p = .82. Surprisingly, for the Control/Load
participants, higher NFC was also associated with lower stereotyping, b = -2.94, SE = 1.95, p =
.14. Overall, findings suggest that Situational Attribution Training worked best for participants
high in NFC who were not cognitively loaded, as they showed reduced automatic stereotype
activation. Thus, it seems that the effects of training are maximized for participants who are
high in NFC and have enough cognitive resources.
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Table 9. Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for the Within-Subjects Model, with
Need for Cognition (NFC), Training Condition, and Load Condition Predicting Stereotyping
Scores, the Difference Between Response Times to Trait and Control Probes in Study 2 (N =
88)
Step 1
Variable

B (SE B)

NFC
Training
Load

Step 2

Step 3

ß

B (SE B)

ß

B (SE B)

ß

-.93 (.80)

-.13

-1.36 (1.60)

-.19

.50 (1.93)

.07

5.49 (27.63)

.02

-30.89 (39.77)

-.12

-18.20 (40.03)

-.07

24.80 (27.45)

.10

-16.01 (42.20)

-.06

-3.79 (42.35)

-.01

NFC X Training

.30 (1.71)

.03

-2.45 (2.35)

-.27

NFC X Load

.33 (1.62)

.03

-3.44 (2.75)

-.32

74.14 (57.14)

.26

68.62 (56.59)

.24

5.72 (3.38)

.43*

Training X Load
NFC X Training
X Load

Note. ΔR² = .02 for Step 2 (p =.64) and ΔR² = .03 for Step 3 (p = .09).
*p = .09
Modern racism and stereotype reduction. Similar to the NFC analyses, I used
the Sum/Difference regression model to investigate the role of modern racism, training, and
load condition on the response times to trait relative to control probes. In the between-subjects
model I entered the sum between the response times to trait and control probes as a dependent
measure and modern racism, training condition (dummy coded; control = 0, training = 1), and
load condition (dummy coded; no load = 0, load = 1) as predictors in the first regression step. A
second step included the three two-way interaction terms between the predictors, and the third
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step included the three-way interaction term between modern racism, training condition, and
load condition. Table 10 presents standardized and unstandardized regression coefficients, as
well as standard errors for main effects and interaction terms in all three regression steps for this
model. Similar to the between-subjects model for the NFC analyses, results revealed a main
effect of load, such that participants who were cognitively loaded while completing the probe
recognition task were significantly slower to respond to both trait and control probes, compared
to participants who were not cognitively loaded. No other main effects or interactions were
significant.
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Table 10. Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for the Between-Subjects Model, with
Modern Racism (MRS), Training Condition, and Load Condition Predicting the Sum Between
Response Times to Trait and Control Probes in Study 2 (N = 88)
Step 1
Variable
MRS
Training
Load

B (SE B)

Step 2
ß

Step 3

B (SE B)

ß

3.53 (8.64)

.04

-7.48 (17.15)

-.09

-7.49 (89.30)

-.01

39.84 (127.36)

.05

306.10 (89.26)

.35* 377.87 (136.82)

B (SE B)
-19.74 (21.00)

ß
-.23

47.18 (127.54)

.05

.43* 382.32 (136.87)

.44
*

MRS X Training
MRS X Load
Training X Load

18.00 (17.98)

.15

39.29 (27.67)

.33

1.91 (18.18)

.02

21.16 (26.31)

.19

-98.70 (184.96)

-.10 -102.05

-.10

(184.97)
MRS X Training

-36.84 (36.40)

-.22

X Load
Note. ΔR² = .06 for Step 2 (p =.14) and ΔR² = .004 for Step 3 (p = .54).
*p = .05
Next, I investigated the within-subjects model, within a hierarchical multiple regression
analysis, which contained the same predictors as the between-subjects model. However, this
model used the difference score between the response times to trait and control probes as a
dependent measure. Similar to the NFC analyses, there was no evidence of implicit stereotyping
across conditions: participants were equally fast at responding to trait versus control probes, as
suggested by the constant in the first regression step, b = 23.40, SE = 23.20, p = .32. Table 11
presents standardized and unstandardized regression coefficients, as well as standard errors for
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main effects and interaction terms in all three regression steps for the within-subjects model.
Findings from the second regression step showed a significant interaction between modern
racism and training condition2. This interaction was trending towards significance in the third
regression step (p = .09). Follow-up analyses showed that the slope of modern racism for
training participants was approaching significance, b= 6.25, SE = 3.71, p = .09, such that higher
modern racism was associated with more stereotyping after completing Situational Attribution
Training. For control participants, the slope of modern racism was not significant, b = -2.97, SE
= 3.66, p = .42, such that the level of modern racism was not significantly related to implicit
stereotyping for participants who did not undergo Situational Attribution Training. Figure 2
presents a graphic representation of this interaction at high and low levels of modern racism
(one standard deviation below and above the mean). Overall, findings suggest that the
stereotyping reduction effects of Situational Attribution Training were most pronounced for
participants who were initially low in modern racism, regardless of whether they were
cognitively loaded or not. Importantly, training seemed to increase implicit bias for individuals
who were high in modern racism.
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Table 11. Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for the Within-Subjects Model, with
Modern Racism (MRS), Training Condition, and Load Condition Predicting the Difference
Between Response Times to Trait and Control Probes in Study 2 (N = 88)
Step 1

Step 2

Step 3

Variable

B (SE B)

ß

B (SE B)

ß

B (SE B)

ß

MRS

1.47 (2.64)

.06

-3.60 (5.10)

-.15

-5.85 (6.27)

-.24

-.08

-18.65 (38.07)

-.07

.01

4.52 (40.85)

.02

Training

11.69 (27.26)

.05 -19.99 (37.87)

Load

29.51 (27.25)

.12

MRS X Training
MRS X Load
Training X Load

3.71 (40.68)
10.52 (5.35)

.30*

14.42 (8.26)

.41

.88 (5.41)

.03

4.40 (7.85)

.14

67.42 (54.99)

.24

66.81 (55.21)

.24

-6.75 (10.86)

-.14

MRS X Training
X Load
Note. ΔR² = .06 for Step 2 (p =.14) and ΔR² = .004 for Step 3 (p = .54).
*p = .05

Motivations to respond without prejudice and stereotype reduction. Similar
Sum/Difference analyses were conducted to investigate the effects of IMS and EMS on
responses to Situational Attribution Training. In the between-subjects model I entered the sum
between the response times to trait and control probes as a dependent measure and IMS, EMS,
training condition (dummy coded; control = 0, training = 1), and load condition (dummy coded;
no load = 0, load = 1) as predictors in the first regression step. A second step included the five
two-way interaction terms between the predictors, and the third step included three-way
interaction terms (IMS, EMS, training condition; IMS, training condition, load condition; EMS,
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training condition, load condition). In the fourth step I added the interaction term between all
predictors. Table 12 presents standardized and unstandardized regression coefficients, as well as
standard errors for main effects and interaction terms in all four regression steps for this model.
Consistent with previous analyses, there was a main effect of load, such that participants who
were cognitively loaded while completing the probe recognition task were significantly slower
to respond to both trait and control probes, compared to participants who were not cognitively
loaded. In addition, there was a main effect of EMS, such that higher EMS was associated with
slower responding to both trait and control probes.
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Table 12. Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for the Between-Subjects Model, with Internal Motivation to Control
Prejudice (IMS), External Motivation to Control Prejudice (EMS), Training Condition, and Load Condition Predicting the Sum
Between Response Times to Trait and Control Probes in Study 2 (N = 88)
Step 1
Variable

Step 2

B (SE B)

B (SE B)

Step 3
ß

B (SE B)

Step 4
ß

B (SE B)

ß

IMS

-4.47 (7.45)

-.06

-11.99 (13.99)

-.16

-13.09 (16.63)

-.17

-13.06 (16.55)

-.17

EMS

-13.59 (5.84)

-.23*

-7.03 (12.21)

-.12

-25.09 (17.09)

-.43

-25.08 (17.01)

-.43

Training

3.93 (87.08)

.01

19.75 (90.41)

.02

17.83 (90.45)

.02

-1.75 (91.22)

-.01

Load

292.92 (87.08)

.34*

262.58 (89.88)

.28* 248.57 (93.07)

.29*

IMS X Training
IMS X Load
EMS X Training
EMS X Load
IMS X EMS

.30* 244.47 (93.48)

13.09 (16.10)

.13

9.30 (20.91)

.09

9.17 (20.81)

.09

-.64 (16.33)

-.01

-4.41 (25.09)

-.04

-4.42 (24.97)

-.04

-18.12 (12.92)

-.24

5.77 (20.81)

.08

10.05 (20.96)

.13

8.15 (12.64)

.10

36.46 (21.52)

.45

36.42 (21.41)

.45

-.11

1.01 (2.02)

.10

.99 (2.01)

.10

-1.18 (2.59)

-.10

-1.03 (1.01)

Training X IMS
X EMS

-2.33 (2.45)

-.20
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Training X Load
X IMS

14.07 (33.40)

17.88 (33.36)

.10

-39.17 (27.28)

-.37

-3.82 (2.89)

-.17

.08

Training X Load
X EMS
Training X Load
X IMS X EMS
Note. ΔR² = .03 for Step 2 (p =.63) , ΔR² = ..03 for Step 3 (p = .35), and ΔR² = .02 for Step 4 (p = .19).
*p < .05
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In the within-subjects model I entered the same predictors as in the between-subjects
model; the dependent measure was the difference score between the response times to control
and trait probes. Table 13 presents standardized and unstandardized regression coefficients, as
well as standard errors for main effects and interaction terms in all three regression steps for the
within-subjects model. Results revealed a significant main effect of IMS, such that higher IMS
was associated with more stereotyping. Findings from the second regression step also revealed a
significant interaction between IMS and EMS. To follow up on the interaction between IMS
and EMS, following recommendations from Aiken and West (1991), I investigated the slopes of
IMS at low and high levels of EMS, calculated at one standard deviation below and above the
mean of EMS, respectively. The simple slope of IMS at high levels of EMS was not significant,
b = -2.21, SE = 3.26, p = .50. However, the simple slope of IMS at low levels of EMS was
significant, b = 10.15, SE = 2.87, p = .001. Higher IMS was associated with more stereotyping
of Black men, but only at low levels of EMS. Discrepant with the Devine and her colleagues
(2002), individuals characterized by high IMS and low EMS were the most likely to show
implicit bias towards Black targets, and this tendency was the same regardless of whether they
completed Situational Attribution Training or not. No other main effects or interactions were
significant.
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Table 13. Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for the Within-Subjects Model, with Internal Motivation to Control Prejudice
(IMS), External Motivation to Control Prejudice (EMS), Training Condition, and Load Condition Predicting the Sum Between
Response Times to Trait and Control Probes in Study 2 (N = 88)
Step 1
Variable

B (SE B)

Step 2
ß

B (SE B)

Step 3
ß

B (SE B)

Step 4
ß

B (SE B)

ß

IMS

4.74 (2.30)

.22*

3.21 (4.13)

.15

3.07 (4.99)

.14

3.08 (4.94)

.14

EMS

.58 (1.80)

.03

-.14 (3.61)

-.01

-2.78 (5.13)

-.16

-2.78 (5.08)

-.16

Training

11.19 (26.82)

.12

22.51 (26.71)

.09

22.21 (27.16)

.09

15.08 (27.24)

.06

Load

30.21 (26.81)

.12

22.26 (26.55)

.10

22.63 (28.07)

.09

24.12 (27.80)

.10

2.36 (4.76)

.08

1.76 (6.28)

.06

1.72 (6.22)

.06

IMS X Load

-1.69 (4.83)

-.05

-2.30 (7.54)

-.07

-2.31 (7.46)

-.07

EMS X Training

-2.76 (3.82)

-.13

.75 (6.25)

.03

2.31 (6.26)

.11

EMS X Load

4.43 (3.74)

.19

8.59 (6.46)

.36

8.58 (6.39)

.34

IMS X EMS

-.94 (.30)

-.65 (.61)

-.23

-.65 (.60)

-.23

.08 (.77)

.02

IMS X Training

-.34*

Training X IMS
X EMS

-.34 (.74)

-.10
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Training X Load
X IMS

2.17 (10.03)

-5.83 (8.23)

-5.69 (8.15)

-.18

-1.39 (.86)

-.22

-.19

Training X Load
X IMS X EMS
Note. ΔR² = .11 for Step 2 (p =.07), ΔR² = .01 for Step 3 (p = .85), and ΔR² = .03 for Step 3 (p = .11).
*p = .05

.07

.04

Training X Load
X EMS

3.56 (9.96)
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Discussion
In the current study I addressed several questions about the mechanisms underlying
Situational Attribution Training. This study did not replicate the previous studies which found
reduced automatic stereotyping as a function of situational attribution training (Stewart et al.,
2010). Overall, participants’ stereotyping scores did not show a significant difference between
training and control condition. Moreover, there was no evidence of automatic stereotype
activation in either the training or the control condition.
Two additional findings are of particular importance and they refer to the moderating
role of individual difference variables on training effects. First, findings suggest that the
efficiency of Situational Attribution Training depends on both personal and situational
constraints related to cognitive complexity. Moderation analyses revealed that training works
best in reducing automatic stereotype activation when participants are high in NFC and are not
cognitively loaded. Why do personal and situational cognitive complexity variables play such
an important role? One explanation is that the Situational Attribution Training technique
accomplishes its goal by teaching participants to take into account complex factors that may
determine negative behaviors performed by Black men. This strategy poses a cognitive
challenge for individuals, because they are required to process more information than in regular
circumstances. Thus, individuals high in NFC, who are naturally inclined to prefer cognitive
challenges, had the easiest time with this challenge and consequently showed the most benefits
from training. Compared to low NFC people, individuals high in NFC may be more predisposed
for the cognitively complex strategy of taking into account situational factors of out-group
members’ behaviors. The finding that these effects are only maintained under conditions of no
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cognitive load suggests that the tendency to correct for stereotypic trait inferences has not
become automatic even for these individuals.
One unexpected pattern of responding was observed for cognitively loaded participants
in the control condition. For these participants, higher NFC was associated with less
stereotyping. Why would higher NFC lead to less stereotyping for loaded controls? This effect
is unclear; however, one explanation may come from previous research on cognitive load and
stereotype activation. Contrary to the idea that cognitive load increases the tendency to rely on
simple cognitive structures such as stereotypes, Gilbert and Hixon (1991) paradoxically found
that loaded participants showed less stereotype activation compared to non-loaded participants.
Their argument was that stereotype activation requires some cognitive or attentional resources.
People who are depleted of those resources are less likely to show stereotype activation. Thus, it
may be normal for our control participants who are loaded to show little stereotype activation.
But why would high NFC individuals show this tendency more than low NFC? One explanation
is that high NFC individuals enjoy processing information and they require cognitive resources
to do so. When these resources are depleted, these high NFC individuals' stereotype activation
suffers even more, such that they are especially less likely to show stereotype activation.
Overall, the findings related to the role of training, cognitive load, and NFC should be
interpreted with caution because the overall interaction between these three variables only
approached significance. Thus, these findings should be interpreted mainly as a trend and future
studies should be conducted to replicate these effects using a different dependent measure. A
discussion of future research ideas that address these limitations is included in the general
discussion.

91
Second, Situational Attribution Training seemed to increase high in modern racism
participants’ stereotyping levels. Generally, individuals high in modern racism explicitly state
that racial discrimination does not exist anymore and thus are unsupportive of Black’s fights for
equal rights. Not surprisingly, these individuals did not internalize the tendency to attribute
negative behaviors of Black men to situational factors and continued to rely on traits when
explaining negative behaviors of Black men. If anything, their high stereotyping scores suggest
that training may elicit reactance. The exposure to negative stereotypic behaviors of African
Americans coupled with the required task of choosing situational explanations may have had an
irritating effect on these participants, ironically leading to an increase in automatic stereotype
activation. This finding and interpretation are consistent with previous racial bias reduction
research – Kawakami and colleagues (2005) found that a variation of the stereotype negation
training led to reduced stereotype application as long as participants were not trying to avoid
being influenced by training. The current study adds to our knowledge of reactance in
stereotype reduction interventions by suggesting that high explicit prejudice increases the
likelihood of such adverse reactions.
Overall, the current findings are consistent with research by Greenberg and Rosenfield,
(1979) as well as Wittenbrink, et al., (1997) who showed that individuals high in explicit
prejudice are more likely to engage in the ultimate attribution error. The current study suggests
that high-prejudice participants are also more resistant to changing this attributional pattern,
thus leading to less implicit bias reduction compared to low-prejudice participants.
The role of individual differences in moderating bias reduction intervention effects has
been rarely documented in the literature (Levy, 1999). In the current research I addressed this
understudied area of prejudice reduction research and showed that Situational Attribution
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Training works best for individuals high in NFC and low in explicit prejudice. Despite their
novelty and importance, these findings should be interpreted with caution because, overall, the
current study was not able to fully replicate the Stewart and colleagues’ (2010) findings.
Specifically, in the current study I did not find a difference in stereotype activation between
training and control participants. In fact, there was no evidence of stereotypic trait activation for
either control or training participants. One reason for the discrepancy between the current
research and the Stewart and colleagues findings may reside in the change of dependent
measure. Unlike previous studies in which we used the person categorization task, in the current
study I used the probe recognition task to measure changes in implicit racial bias. It may be that
this measure is not sensitive enough to capture changes in stereotype activation following an
intervention. In fact, there are no implicit bias reduction studies to date that used the probe
recognition task as a dependent measure. The majority of studies from this literature employ
quick categorization tasks such as sequential priming tasks (for example the person
categorization task, Kawkami et al., 2000; Stewart et al., 2010), the IAT (Kawakami et al.,
2000), or the weapons identification task (Stewart & Payne, 2008). Moreover, some studies
using the probe recognition task have had difficulty in finding automatic stereotype activation
for racial stereotypes even in the absence of any intervention. For example, Stewart et al. (2003)
has found stereotyping effects with the probe recognition task only for positive, but not negative
Black stereotypic traits.
Another indication that the dependent measure used in the current study may be
problematic comes from the failure to replicate previous findings documenting the relationship
between motivations to control prejudice and implicit racial bias. Devine and her colleagues
(2002) found that individuals who are at the same time high in IMS and low in EMS display the
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least implicit bias towards Blacks. Latu and colleagues (in press) replicated these findings for
implicit gender bias. In contrast to these existing studies, the current research revealed that high
IMS /low EMS participants showed the greatest level of implicit race bias, using the probe
recognition task as a measure. This opposite pattern of findings suggests that our measure taps
into different aspects of implicit racial bias than sequential priming tasks commonly used in
implicit bias and implicit bias reduction research.
It is also important to speculate whether the failure to replicate Stewart et al. (2010)
suggests that their findings are unreliable and thus Situational Attribution Training is not an
effective tool in reducing automatic stereotype activation. However, it is not immediately
apparent what the difference between the current studies and prior studies that have found
support for the training’s effectiveness (Stewart et al., 2010) might be, with the exception of the
dependent measure used – the person categorization task in Stewart and colleagues and the
probe recognition task in the current study. Otherwise, the studies had the same participant pool,
used the same version of training, and were conducted within a two-year period by
experimenters that were trained in a similar fashion. The finding that basic automatic
stereotyping effects were not found for control participants in the current study (unlike for
Stewart et al.’s controls), suggests that the probe recognition task is not appropriate for
capturing the hypothesized effects and that Stewart et al. findings may be more reliable than the
current findings. More research is needed, however, to address this issue. Future studies should
investigate whether the Stewart et al. findings replicate using other measures of automatic
stereotype activation, such as the lexical decision task or the IAT.
If the failure to replicate previous findings for training effectiveness and IMS/EMS is
task-dependent, a different method for assessing implicit bias should be employed in future
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research. The probe recognition task was employed in this study because of its successful
history of being used in conjunction with a cognitive load task. A pretest revealed that the
person categorization task, which was used in previous Situational Attribution Training studies,
was not appropriate for the current goals. Theoretically, one hypothesis is that participants who
are highly loaded should show more automatic stereotype activation compared to low-load
participants, because depletion of cognitive resources should be associated with a greater
tendency to rely on schemas and stereotypes. Gilbert and Hixon (1991) found the opposite
pattern of results, with loaded participants showing more stereotype activation compared to
non-loaded participants. Inconsistent with either of these two hypotheses, neither low nor highload pretest participants showed automatic stereotype activation when using the person
categorization task. This finding may not be surprising for the high-load participants –
consistent with Gilbert and Hixon (1991), cognitive load sometimes has the paradoxical effect
of decreasing stereotype activation. However, at a minimum, low-load participants should have
shown automatic stereotype activation in order to proceed with the person categorization task as
a dependent measure in the current studies. In addition, a significant difference between low and
high load conditions on stereotype activation in the pretest would have motivated its use in
conjunction with the Situational Attribution Training technique.
One problem may be that sequential priming tasks such as the person categorization task
are designed to tap into automatic associations. As a consequence, adding cognitive load to
assess the degree of automaticity of a process may lead to a ceiling effect of automaticity, thus
confounding the results. Thus, one possibility for future research is to investigate the effects of
training on intentional trait and situational inferences, by having participants make conscious
attributions of negative stereotypic behaviors performed by Black men. As suggested in the
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Study 1 discussion, this methodology would allow for the investigation of the effects of training
on intentional inferences, and subsequently of processing goals. Half of the participants should
complete this task under regular conditions and half under conditions of high cognitive load, to
investigate whether the increase or decrease in the tendency to make situational or trait
inferences is becoming more automatic following Situational Attribution Training. Adding
cognitive load to an intentional inference task would allow us to investigate even slight
increases in the automaticity of this process.
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Figure 1. Stereotyping Level by Level of Need for Cognition (NFC), Training and Load
Condition
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Figure 2. Stereotyping Level by Training Condition and Initial Level of Modern Racism
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CHAPTER 3: GENERAL DISCUSSION
The goal of the current studies was to investigate the mechanisms and moderators of
Situational Attribution Training in reducing automatic stereotype activation. I proposed four
hypotheses related to the effects of training on spontaneous situational and trait inferences, the
automaticity of the effects of training, and individual differences that may moderate the
effectiveness of training.

Hypotheses Review
Hypothesis 1. Situational Attribution Training increases the tendency to make
spontaneous situational inferences for negative stereotypic behaviors performed by African
American men. The Study 1 findings did not support this hypothesis. Participants who were
trained to consider situational explanations of negative Black stereotypic behaviors showed
automatic activation of SSIs; but so did control participants. These findings are inconsistent with
previous research (Stewart et al., 2010), which found evidence of SSI activation only in the
training but not in the control condition. However, those data were preliminary and analyses
were conducted on a small sample size (N=18), with the overall interaction between probe type
and condition not being significant. Thus, the present data suggest caution in interpreting the
prior research that showed SSI activation after Situational Attribution Training.
Hypothesis 2. Participants who complete Situational Attribution Training should show
reduced stereotype activation, as suggested by decreased STI activation for negative stereotypic
traits. Study 2 findings failed to replicate entirely the stereotype reduction effects of training
found in previous research (Stewart et al., 2010) as well as to show automatic stereotype
activation in the control conditions. Regression analyses revealed that only participants high in

NFC showed reliable stereotyping reduction effects after completing Situational Attribution
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Training. This partial replication may be due to the task used to measure automatic stereotype
activation – the probe recognition task – a task rarely used in prejudice reduction research.
Hypothesis 3. If the effects of Situational Attribution Training have become automatic,
participants should show reduced automatic stereotype activation regardless of whether they are
cognitively loaded or not when completing the probe recognition task. As discussed above,
reliable stereotype reduction effects were only found for participants who were high in NFC.
Contrary to the third hypothesis, these stereotype reduction effects were not maintained under
conditions of high cognitive load. This finding suggests that taking into account situations when
being exposed to negative Black stereotypic behaviors has not become automatic after
Situational Attribution Training.
Hypothesis 4. Individual differences such as explicit prejudice, motivations to control
prejudice, NFC and PNS should moderate the effects of training on automatic stereotype
activation. Consistent with this hypothesis, moderation analyses revealed that Situational
Attribution Training worked best for individuals who were initially higher in NFC. Also, training
had the opposite effect for individuals high in modern racism who showed an increase in implicit
bias. No moderation effects were found for motivations to control prejudice and PNS.

Overall Implications of Findings
There are several explanations and implications of current findings that are relevant to the
implicit bias reduction literature. I will discuss three of these issues in detail. First, I discuss the
methodological limitations of the current studies and their implications for interpreting the
current findings. Second, I discuss a possible theoretical model of the mechanism underlying
training success, which may account for the current findings. Third, I discuss findings related to
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individual differences moderating training effects, as well as the implication of these findings for
designing successful anti-bias interventions. It should be noted that the term “training success”
refers to this technique’s effectiveness as documented in previous research (Stewart et al., 2010),
as well as in the current research for some participants (high in NFC).
First, the dependent measures used in the second study may not have been appropriate to
answer our specific research questions. Using an adapted version of the probe recognition task to
measure implicit bias in the form of spontaneous trait inferences, I was not able to replicate the
Stewart et al. (2010) findings, which showed that training participants exhibited less stereotype
activation compared to controls. A second indication that the probe recognition task in Study 2
did not assess implicit racial bias as measured in the previous literature is that I was not able to
replicate the IMS/EMS findings found in racial bias (Devine et al., 2002) and gender bias (Latu
et al., in press) research. In fact, using the probe recognition task, I found the opposite pattern of
findings from studies that used sequential priming tasks or the IAT. Unfortunately, the failure of
Study 2 to replicate basic previous findings casts some doubt on the significant findings of the
current research. For example, it is hard to have full confidence and meaningfully interpret the
finding that training may work best for individuals high in NFC and low in modern racism given
that, overall, I did not replicate the stereotyping reduction effects of training. Future studies
should be conducted to elucidate whether the current findings are reliable and replicate with
other paradigms or whether the findings are unreliable and only due to methodological
peculiarities of the current study. I include a thorough description of future research ideas in the
next section of this chapter.
Despite its methodological limitations, findings of the current studies suggest some new
directions in understanding the mechanism behind Situational Attribution Training. As
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mentioned above, these interpretations should be regarded as tentative given the methodological
issues discussed.
Training involves teaching participants to make situational attributions for negative
stereotypic behaviors performed by Black men. How does this training technique achieve its
success? Is it automatizing participants’ tendency to make situational inferences or is it a more
controlled process in which participants deliberately change their processing goals from
understanding the person to understanding the situation in which the person is? Overall, the
findings of two studies suggest that training participants in situational attributions may change
individuals’ processing goals, such that they are more invested in understanding the situation in
which the target is, rather than the stable traits of the person. Consistent with Krull and
Erickson’s (1995) attributional model, this change in processing goals determines individuals to
infer situational causes first, thus circumventing the otherwise automatic tendency of inferring
trait or dispositional causes.
There are three main findings from the current studies that suggest that Situational

Attribution Training may achieve its success through a conscious process of changing processing
goals. First, training did not increase the tendency to make SSIs above and beyond comparable
control training. Although the current data do not address the effects of training on intentional
inferences, future studies may show that training has a significant effect on such intentional
situational inferences. Second, the automatic stereotype reduction effects of training for high
NFC participants were only observed when participants were not cognitively loaded while
completing the dependent task. If training effects disappear when participants are engaged in a
competing cognitive task, the tendency to take into account situational factors (thus correcting
for inflated trait attributions) has not yet become automatic. Thus, it may be that a consciously
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controlled process is responsible for the Situational Attribution Training effects. Last, explicit

prejudice moderated the effects of training on automatic stereotype activation, such that training
worked best for participants who were low in modern racism. The finding that a conscious,
explicit attitude makes participants more likely to respond positively to training suggests that its
effects may be consciously controlled.
Present findings suggest that a conscious process of changing processing goals may
account for the effectiveness of Situational Attribution Training in decreasing stereotype
activation. But how would this process look like? How does a conscious process (such as
changing goals) permeate to the automatic level such that automatic stereotype activation is
decreased? Figure 3 presents a summary of this proposed process. Consistent with Krull and
Erickson’s three-stage attribution model (1995), Situational Attribution Training may be
changing individuals’ processing focus from understanding the person to understanding the
situation. In turn, this change in focus may sabotage trait inferences, thus reducing negative trait
– racial group associations. This hypothesis should be investigated in future research.
One interesting option would be to measure both trait associations and situational
inferences following training. This strategy would offer the opportunity to conduct a mediation
analysis to investigate if increases in situational inferences mediate the relationship between
training and reduced trait activation. This goal may be difficult to achieve, however, given that
the concomitant activation of both situational and trait inferences may be hard to measure. In
fact, previous research has never documented the co-occurrence of trait and situational
inferences for the same person (in a within subjects design), only for the same behavior (in a
between subjects design; Ham & Vonk, 2006). Attempting to document the activation of both
trait and situational inferences for the same perceiver has its risks, because their activation may
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prove to be mutually exclusive. In addition, once an inference (situational or trait) is activated
during its assessment, it can interfere with and bias the assessment of other inferences.

Other studies also looked at how conscious goals reduce automatic stereotype activation.
For example, Stewart and Payne (2008) had participants complete a weapons identification task
in which they had to decide whether objects presented on the screen were tools or weapons, after
being primed with photos of Black and White men. In previous research using this task (Payne,
2001), participants showed evidence of automatic stereotype activation, as they were quicker to
decide that an object was a gun after being primed with a Black compared to a White photo, and
they were more likely to incorrectly classify a tool as a gun after being primed with a Black
compared to a White photo. In Stewart and Payne, while completing the weapons identification
task, participants were told to think non-stereotypic thoughts (thinking “safe” when seeing a
Black man). Compared to controls, participants who engaged in this conscious control strategy
showed reduced automatic stereotype activation. Using a similar conscious strategy, Kawakami
and her colleagues (2002) found reduced stereotype activation after participants repeatedly said
NO to traits stereotypic of Blacks, skinheads, and elderly people.
However, one risk of such techniques is that conscious thought suppression may
ironically increase the frequency of the suppressed thought, a phenomenon called the rebound
effect. Previous research revealed that stereotype suppression can actually lead to an increase in
stereotyping, due to a rebound effect (Macrae et al., 1994, Payne, Lambert, & Jacoby, 2002). The
Situational Attribution Training technique avoids such rebound effects, as it does not ask
participants to suppress stereotypes. In fact, the training task is not even presented to participants
as being related to racial stereotyping. Instead, participants are trained to think of situational
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explanations, and this novel attributional strategy led to reduced stereotype activation. Thus, the
ironic effects of suppression are likely to be reduced.
Finally, another major contribution that the current research makes to the implicit bias
reduction literature is unraveling the role of individual differences in response to training. With
few exceptions, there are no studies that systematically investigated how individual differences

relate to stereotyping reduction interventions. The current research revealed that individuals high
in NFC and low in explicit prejudice showed the most pronounced benefits from Situational
Attribution Training. How can this training technique be adapted to address individuals who are
low in NFC and high in modern racism? Individuals low in NFC do not enjoy and seek to
process novel information. Thus, these individuals may benefit from a training technique which
automatizes certain processing strategies – a tactic which would diminish their processing needs.
For example, it may be that repeated, shorter training sessions may increase automatic situational
inferences and, as a consequence, reduce stereotyping. Individuals high in modern racism
explicitly believe that racial prejudice and discrimination are no longer a problem. As such, it is
possible that they showed more reactance to training, guessing that it was designed to reduce
racial stereotyping. In the future, it may be that reducing demand characteristics may enhance
training effects for participants who are high in modern racism, by reducing reactance. One idea
would be to train participants in making situational attribution not only for Black but also for
White stereotypic behaviors. This strategy would also be of theoretical interest, because it would
allow us to investigate whether teaching participants a general attributional strategy, not
necessarily specifically related to Black stereotypes, would reduce automatic stereotype
activation.

Future Directions
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In the current studies I answered some questions about the mechanisms and moderators
of Situational Attribution Training; current findings, however, also raised as many interesting
questions, which inform plans for future research. In future studies I plan to make several
modifications to the current paradigm in order to test the mechanism and moderators of
Situational Attribution Training.
First, future research should investigate the effects of Situational Attribution Training on
intentional trait and situational inferences using one of the existing research paradigms. For
example, one of the commonly used inference research paradigms dates back to Jones and
Davis’ (1965) work on the correspondence bias and involves the presentation of several
behaviors. In that paradigm, the participants’ task is to indicate the extent to which certain traits
or situational properties account for those behaviors. In a more recent version of this paradigm,
Gilbert et al. (1988) had participants watch a videotape of a job interview with a woman who
was behaving in an anxious manner. Participants were asked to rate on a 9-point Likert scale
how anxious the woman was (trait factor) as well as how anxiety provoking they thought the
interview was (situational factor). A similar methodology could be employed to investigate the
effects of Situational Attribution Training on intentional trait and situational inferences.
Following training, participants would be exposed to several negative Black-stereotypic
behaviors not presented during training, in written or video format. Afterwards, participants’
intentional inferences of those behaviors would be assessed. It may be, however, that participants
who completed training would deliberately inflate their intentional situational attributions
because of demand characteristics associated with training. To minimize these effects, the
research paradigm could be adapted to require an open-ended response from participants. Their

106

task would be to write a paragraph explaining the causes of the person’s behavior. The output
would be analyzed using content analysis, by counting the number of trait and situational
explanations employed by participants. This strategy may not fully eliminate demand
characteristics, but it would diminish their impact.
Overall, further investigating the effects of Situational Attribution Training on both
intentional and automatic inferences (using alternative research methods and designs) would
bring insight into the processes underlying the previously documented effects of Situational

Attribution Training. Is Situational Attribution Training changing participants’ inference goals,
such that they are more invested in understanding situations rather than traits? If this is the case,
we should see that training increases intentional situational inferences, but not spontaneous
situational inferences. The other possibility may be that participants’ goal remains that of
understanding the person and not the situation, and training is automatizing the tendency to take
into account the situation, in addition to inferring traits automatically. If this is the case, we
should see that training increases spontaneous, but not intentional situational inferences.
Second, I would make several modifications to the second study of the current research.
To start with, I would not use the probe recognition task to measure automatic stereotyping;
instead, I would replicate previous findings from Stewart and colleagues (2010) using a
sequential priming task such as the lexical decision task (Wittenbrink et al., 1997) or the IAT
(Greenwald et al., 1998). These tasks have been commonly used in stereotype reduction research
(see Blair, 2001 for a review) and are thus sensitive enough to capture variations of automatic
associations. Moreover, tasks such as the lexical decision task may be even more appropriate and
sensitive than the person categorization task in measuring stereotype activation. In the person
categorization task, participants categorize Black and White faces after being primed with Black

stereotypic words. The underlying idea is that stereotypic traits would activate the racial
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stereotype, which would facilitate the categorization of Black versus White faces. In the lexical
decision task, the order of the trait and photo is reversed, such that participants classify traits as
positive or negative after being primed with Black and White faces. I would expect this measure
to be more sensitive than the person categorization task because the exposure to a group
exemplar (i.e., the Black photo) would be more likely to activate certain stereotypic traits (e.g.,
lazy) compared to the reversed order. This presentation order would also map more closely onto
the theoretical understanding of stereotyping in which the group activates the stereotypic trait
and not vice-versa.
Also, using the lexical decision task as a measure of stereotype activation, I would
attempt to replicate the moderating effects found in the current study. I would measure individual
differences such as explicit prejudice, motivations to control prejudice, NFC, and PNS before
participants complete Situational Attribution Training. Hopefully, findings would not only
replicate those of the current study, but they would also strengthen the marginal effects found for
NFC in the current study. Additionally, I would also investigate the moderating role of
attributional complexity in moderating responses to training. Attributional complexity (Fletcher,
Danilovics, Fernandez, Peterson, & Reeder, 1986) refers to the extent to which individuals use
complex schemas in determining behavioral causes. This individual difference is strongly related
to individuals’ tendency to use situational explanations in determining the cause of others’
behaviors, as suggested by Fletcher and colleagues’ multi-construct definition of attributional
complexity. Three of these constructs measure situational explanations: awareness of how
interaction with other people influence behaviors (e.g., “I think very little about the different
ways that people influence each other.”), awareness of abstract, distal causes that may determine
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behaviors (e.g., “I think a lot about the influence that society has on other people.”), as well as

awareness of external causes from the past which may determine behaviors (e.g., When I analyze
a person’s behavior I often find the causes from a chain that goes back in time, sometimes for
years.”). Attributional complexity correlates with several variables relevant to the proposed
studies. For example, it is significantly related to NFC (Fletcher et al.), perspective taking and
empathy (Joireman, 2004) and explicit stereotyping of minimal groups (Schaller, Boyd,
Yohannes, O’Brien, 1995). Based on these findings, I hypothesize that attributional complexity
will moderate Situational Attribution Training effects, such that individuals high in attributional
complexity will have an easier time completing the training and will also gain the most benefits
from training in terms of implicit bias reduction.
Finally, I would use a cognitive load task while participants are completing the
intentional situational inference task, to investigate whether training is automatizing the tendency
to make intentional situational inferences. In the current study, the cognitive load task
accompanied the probe recognition task, which assesses the relatively automatic process of trait
inferences. Thus, it was difficult to assess whether a process that was already automatic has
become even more automatic after training. By adding cognitive load to an explicit, intentional
situational inference task, I would be able to assess more precisely whether the process of
inferring situational causes has increased in automaticity after Situational Attribution Training.

Training Applications
Once the effectiveness of Situational Attribution Training is documented in the
controlled, laboratory environment, it would be interesting to design several real-world
applications of this technique. For example, groups other than college students may be especially
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likely to benefit from Situational Attribution Training. Training could reduce teachers’ racial and
gender stereotypes and thus reduce the likelihood of stereotype threat for minority students.

Similarly, training police officers in situational attributions may decrease racially biased shooting
errors previously documented with the shoot/don’t shoot paradigm (Correll et al., 2002).
Before Situational Attribution Training is implemented in applied settings, several steps
need to be taken inside the lab to ensure the maximum efficiency of this technique. For example,
future studies should establish if shorter (possibly repeated) training sessions may be more
effective than the current version of training. Also, future studies should investigate whether
teaching participants to consider situational factors of African American men’s behaviors would
also decrease implicit bias towards other groups on which training was not conducted. This
finding would be consistent with the idea that Situational Attribution Training is teaching
participants to automatize a novel critical thinking strategy that determines them to seek
situational explanations for others’ behaviors. In addition, future research should be conducted to
establish the durability of its effectiveness. Theoretically, the current training technique has less
of a chance of a rebound effect because of its indirect nature and lack of stereotype negation.
However, future empirical work needs to be conducted to test this assumption and to investigate
whether training effects are maintained in 24 hours, a week, and even longer.

Conclusion
In the stereotyping reduction literature it is important to document how and for whom
certain interventions are effective. The current studies bring us a step closer to answering these
questions related to Situational Attribution Training. With some methodological caveats, the
mechanism underlying the success of training seems to be a consciously controlled one – that of
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taking into account situational factors, suggesting that this training technique circumvents the

well-documented tendency to engage in the ultimate attribution error. Of theoretical and practical
importance, Situational Attribution Training is more efficient for individuals low in modern
racism and high in NFC. These findings can inform future research, by designing stereotyping
reduction interventions that are customized for individuals based on their individual differences.

111

Change in processing goals: individual
becomes more invested in understanding the
situation than the person. As a result,
intentional situational inferences become
more frequent and more efficient

Situational Attribution
Training

Figure 3. The Mechanism Behind Situational Attribution Training

Decrease in frequency and
efficiency of trait inferences:
individual is less likely to
associate Blacks with
negative traits
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ENDNOTES
1

I also pretested the load manipulation in conjunction with the person categorization task, which

was used in previous research (Stewart et al., 2010) to measure automatic stereotype activation
following Situational Attribution Training. In this paradigm, participants’ task was to categorize
Black and White photographs by race as quickly as possible, after being exposed to a trait for
240ms. Of interest were eight negative traits that were stereotypic of Black men, and that were
not presented during the training phase. To the extent that participants spontaneously activate
negative stereotypes of Blacks, they should be faster to categorize a Black photo compared to a
White photo, after being primed with a negative stereotypic trait. In the load pretest, 33
participants completed the person categorization task while being randomly assigned to either a
low or high cognitive load condition. The load manipulation was adapted from several load tasks
used in previous research (e.g., Bodner & Stalinski, 2008, Stewart et al., 2003, Wigboldus et al.,
2004; see Table 1 for a summary of cognitive load manipulations in the literature). In the low
load condition, 16 participants were presented with 16 one-digit numbers for 1,000ms, at random
intervals between 5 to 9 trials of the person categorization task. Participants’ task was to
remember and recall these numbers in writing, before a new number was presented. In the high
load condition, 17 participants memorized and recalled a total of 16 six and seven-digit numbers
that were presented for 6,000 and 7,000 ms, respectively. Presumably, rehearsing five and sixdigit numbers while completing the categorization task would lead to significantly higher
cognitive load compared to rehearsing one-digit numbers. The results confirmed this hypothesis:
participants were overall slower to categorize photos in the high load condition (M = 627.03)
compared to the low load condition (M = 550.13), t(31) = 2.02, p = .05, Cohen’s d = .72.
However, of interest to our research goals, I was not able to see evidence of automatic stereotype

activation in either condition, as participants were not faster to categorize Black compared to
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White photos after being primed with a Black negative trait either in the low load condition,
F(15) = .71, p = .41, η2 = .04, or the high load condition, F(16) = .79, p = .39, η2 = .05 . As such,
the probe recognition task was used instead, because previous research (Wigboldus et al. 2003,
Stewart et al., 2003) has successfully used cognitive load manipulations in conjunction with this
task to measure the automaticity of stereotypic trait inferences.
2

This effect was not significant in equivalent analyses using the difference score between control

and trait probes for White photo trials.
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APPENDIX A - CONDITIONS
Example of a Typical Screen in the Situational Attribution Training Condition

Example of a Typical Screen in the Grammar Control Condition
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APPENDIX B - SCALES
Social Distance Scale
I would be willing to have a Black American person as my:

STRONGLY

STRONGLY

DISAGREE

AGREE

Good Friend

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Next Door Neighbor

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Co-worker

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Roommate

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Child's Friend

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Sibling's spouse

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Romantic Date

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Family physician

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

U.S. President

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Governor

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Wife or Husband

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Child's teacher

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Dance partner

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Fellow church or
Social club member

Attitude towards Blacks/Modern Racism Scale
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If I had a chance to introduce Black visitors to my friends and neighbors, I would be pleased to
do so.
Some Blacks are so touchy about race that it is difficult to get along with them.
The federal government should take decisive steps to override the injustices Blacks suffer at the
hand of local authorities.
I would rather not have Blacks live in the same apartment building I live in.
I get very upset when I hear a White make a prejudicial remark about Blacks.
Blacks and Whites are inherently equal.
It is likely that Blacks will bring violence into neighborhoods when they move in.
Discrimination against Blacks is no longer a problem in the United States.
Blacks are too demanding in their push for equal rights.
Blacks should not push themselves where they are not wanted.
I would not mind at all if a Black family with about the same income and education moved in
next door.
I enjoy a funny racial joke, even if some people might find it offensive.

Racial integration (of schools, businesses, residences, etc.) has benefited both Whites and
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Blacks.
I would probably feel somewhat self-conscious dancing with a Black person in a public place.
I favor open housing laws that allow more racial integration of neighborhoods.
Whites should support Blacks in their struggle against discrimination and segregation.
Generally, Blacks are not as smart as Whites.
Over the past few years, the government and news media have shown more respect for Blacks
than they deserve.
Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve.
Blacks have more influence on school desegregation plans than they deserve.
If a Black were put in charge of me, I would not mind taking advice and direction from him or
her.
I think that Black people look more similar to each other than White people do.
Interracial marriage should be discouraged to avoid the “who-am-I?” confusion, which the
children feel.
It would not bother me if my new roommate was Black.
I worry that in the next few years I may be denied my application for a job or promotion because
of preferential treatment given to minority group members.

Internal/External Motivation to Control Prejudice Scale
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Because of today's PC (politically correct) standards I try to appear nonprejudiced toward Black
people.
I try to hide any negative thoughts about Black people in order to avoid negative reactions from
others.
If I acted prejudiced toward Black people, I would be concerned that others would be angry with
me.
I attempt to appear nonprejudiced toward Black people in order to avoid disapproval from others.
I try to act nonprejudiced toward Black people because of pressure from others.
I attempt to act in nonprejudiced ways toward Black people because it is personally important to
me.
According to my personal values, using stereotypes about Black people is OK.
I am personally motivated by my beliefs to be nonprejudiced toward Black people.
Because of my personal values, I believe that using stereotypes about Black people is wrong.
Being nonprejudiced toward Black people is important to my self-concept.

The need for cognition scale
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I would prefer complex to simple problems.
I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking.
Thinking is not my idea of fun.
I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge
my thinking abilities.
I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance that I will have to think in
depth about something.
I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.
I only think as hard as I have to.
I prefer to think about small, daily projects as opposed to long-term ones.
I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned then.
The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.
I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.
Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much.
I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.
The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.
I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat
important but does not require much thought.

I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that requires a lot of mental effort.
It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how and why it works.
I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally.
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Personal Need for Structure

It upsets me to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it.
I’m not bothered by things that interrupt my daily routine.
I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life.
I like to have a place for everything and everything in its place.
I enjoy being spontaneous.
I don’t like situations that are uncertain.
I hate to change my plans at the last minute.
I hate to be with people that are unpredictable.
I find that a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more.
I enjoy the exhilaration of being in unpredictable situations.
I become uncomfortable when the rules in a situation are not clear.
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